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Abstract
We address the problem of Byzantine collaborative learning: a set of n nodes try to
collectively learn from data, whose distributions may vary from one node to another. None
of them is trusted and f < n can behave arbitrarily.
We show that collaborative learning is equivalent to a new form of agreement, which we
call averaging agreement. In this problem, nodes start each with an initial vector and seek
to approximately agree on a common vector, while guaranteeing that this common vector
remains within a constant (also called averaging constant) of the maximum distance between
the original vectors. Essentially, the smaller the averaging constant, the better the learning.
We present three asynchronous solutions to averaging agreement, each interesting in its
own right. The first, based on the minimum volume ellipsoid, achieves asymptotically the
best-possible averaging constant but requires n ≥ 6f + 1. The second, based on reliable
broadcast, achieves optimal Byzantine resilience, i.e., n ≥ 3f + 1, but requires signatures
and induces a large number of communication rounds. The third, based on coordinate-wise
trimmed mean, is faster and achieves optimal Byzantine resilience, i.e., n ≥ 4f + 1, within
standard form algorithms that do not use signatures.
1 Introduction
Data is the main ingredient of Machine Learning (ML). The natural distribution of data over
different sources, together with privacy concerns, call for collaborative machine learning. Each
machine (node) keeps its data locally and exchanges with other machines what it learned so
far. If all machines correctly execute the algorithms assigned to them, collaborative learning
is rather easy. The classical stochastic gradient descent (SGD) [4] technique can indeed be
effectively distributed through averaging [18].
But in a realistic distributed setting, machines crash, software may be buggy, hardware
components may behave arbitrarily, and worst, machines can be hacked. In the parlance of
distributed computing, machines can be Byzantine [19]. Given that ML is used in many critical
applications nowadays (driving, flying, medication), the ability to tolerate Byzantine behavior
is of paramount importance.
We pose and address in this paper, for the first time, the problem of collaborative learning
in a Byzantine environment. A set of n nodes try to collectively learn from data, whose local
distribution may vary. None of these nodes is trusted and f < n can be Byzantine.
Before discussing our findings, it is important to distinguish the question we address in this
paper from that addressed by a large body of recent work, also coined “Byzantine distributed
1Authors are listed alphabetically.
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machine learning”, e.g., [3, 2, 7]. As we discuss below, these approaches assume a centralized
trusted server, usually called the parameter server [20]. Only the workers, typically computing
gradients, can be Byzantine. The challenge there is for the central server to converge to a good
model despite a fraction of Byzantine workers.
We consider in this paper a more general and genuinely distributed setting, namely a fully
decentralized system without any trusted node. The setting we consider is also general in the
sense that it is heterogeneous: each node has a local loss function that may differ from other
nodes’ local losses. We encompass the classical parameter server model [20], where several
servers would be involved to avoid a single point of failure, as well as the so-called federated
learning model [18], where decentralized edge devices collaborate to learn.
Our main result is that the problem of collaborative learning is equivalent to a new abstract
form of Byzantine agreement we introduce in this paper, and which we call averaging agreement.
Each node starts with an initial vector and seeks to eventually and approximately agree on a
common vector that remains within a constant (also called averaging constant) of the maximum
distance between the original vectors.
We propose three algorithms to solve averaging agreement, each optimal according to some
dimension. The first algorithm is asymptotically optimal with respect to its averaging constant
and induces a learning algorithm that is, in a precise sense, optimal. The algorithm assumes
however a large proportion of honest nodes. The second algorithm assumes a minimal num-
ber of Byzantine players. It requires however nodes to sign all their messages and involves a
large number of communication rounds. The third algorithm does not require signatures and
involves a small number of communication rounds. It is optimal within a class of standard form
Byzantine protocols [13, 9].
Main technical contributions and proof techniques
We assume in our collaborative learning problem that each local node j has access to a local
data-driven non-convex loss function L(j), but wants to learn a parameter θ(j) that minimizes
the average loss function L¯ = 1n−f
∑L(j) of honest nodes. Our collaborative learning criterion is
of the form1 E
∥∥∥∇L¯(θ(j)∗ )∥∥∥
2
≤M , where θ(j)∗ is the model learned by the node j in a randomly
chosen time *. We also demand the models learned by different nodes to be nearly identical,
i.e., θ
(j)
∗ ≈ θ(k)∗ for any two correct nodes j and k. These notions are formalized in Section 2.
We prove that the collaborative learning problem is equivalent to a new abstract form of
Byzantine agreement, averaging agreement: nodes each start each with an initial vector, and
must each halt with a final vector. Final vectors must be arbitrarily close to one another and
remaining C-close of the maximum distance between the original vectors. We prove a strong
dependence between the bounds M and C and, in particular, the lower bound we prove on C
implies a lower bound on M .
We prove the equivalence between the two problems through two reductions. On the one
hand, we show that any solution to collaborative learning with right hand side M can be used
to solve averaging agreement with an averaging constant C + ε. Our proof essentially relies on
the observation that averaging initial vectors amounts to selecting a vector that minimizes the
sum of square distances to the initial vectors.
On the other hand, we show that (M + ε)-collaborative learning can be reduced to C-
averaging agreement. Here, the reduction algorithm and the proof are more convoluted. The
algorithm essentially applies the standard stochastic gradient descent schemes. It also relies
on applying averaging agreement both to nodes’ parameters, so that they eventually learn the
same models, as well as to the gradient estimates, to guarantee that any local learning update
1This somehow weaker convergence guarantee is not surprising for non-convex situations [5], especially in our
case where heterogeneity adds further complexity.
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is sufficiently similar to what would have been updated, if nodes could access the average loss
gradient ∇L¯ (·).
The main strategy of our proof is to focus on what we call the effective gradient. This
describes how the average of local nodes’ parameters evolve through time. We carefully analyse
how the diameters of honest nodes’ parameters θ(j) can be controlled through time and how far
the effective gradient can be from the average loss gradient of the average of local parameters,
in particular by exploiting a function αt to control the different error terms. We show that, by
doing so, classical convergence proofs of machine learning can be adapted modulo tackling a
specific difficulty: to guarantee that our bounds are constructive. This is crucial for the ability
of the nodes to compute them and know when and how to halt.
There are different ways to solve the averaging agreement problem and hence obtain col-
laborative learning solutions. We present three of them, all asynchronous, i.e., none makes
any assumption of nodes’ relative speeds or communication delays. Each however is optimized
according to a specific dimension and hence, we believe, interesting in its own right. The
first algorithm, based on the minimum volume ellipsoid [23], is compute–intensive and requires
n ≥ 6f + 1. But it ensures an averaging constant that is asymptotically optimal when n ≫ f .
To guarantee that this algorithm achieves averaging agreement with an asymptotically optimal
averaging constant, we first note that its filtering scheme (used to select vectors exchanged
across nodes) guarantees that Byzantine inputs that could be selected cannot be arbitrarily
bad. As n≫ f , intuitively, their effect becomes sufficiently small so that the algorithm behaves
sufficiently like an averaging algorithm. Not only does this guarantee a good averaging con-
stant, but also, crucially, for n ≥ 6f + 1, this also guarantees the contraction of honest nodes.
In fact, the reason why such an algorithm cannot tolerate a large proportion of Byzantine nodes
failures is that, given that harmful Byzantine inputs can still be selected, contraction is harder
to achieve.
The asymptotic optimality of this first algorithm is derived from a lower bound we prove on
the averaging constant. The proof of this lower bound relies on a property implied by Byzantine
averaging agreement, which we call quasi-unanimity. Quasi-unanimity asserts that if a node j
sees f nodes or fewer that send messages that are different from all other nodes’ (i.e., the n− f
other nodes all send identical messages), then node j must output a vector that only depends on
the identical message of these other nodes. For instance, if node j only receives q ≤ n messages
(including itself), q− f of which only say that j has initial vector 0, then node j must output 0.
This condition turns out to be sufficient to impose strong guarantees on the averaging constant.
Our second algorithm, based on asynchronous reliable broadcast and a witness mecha-
nism [1], achieves optimal Byzantine tolerance, i.e., n ≥ 3f + 1. It requires however crypto-
graphic signatures and induces a large number of communication rounds. Our third algorithm,
based on coordinate–wise trimmed mean, is fast to compute (quasi–linear) and achieves opti-
mal Byzantine resilience among algorithms that have a standard form in the sense of [9], i.e.,
n ≥ 4f + 1.
Our main proof technique to prove the correctness of the last two algorithms relies on
the properties of coordinate-wise ℓr-diameters (which we use for r = 2). In particular, while
coordinate-wise trimmed mean does not guarantee the contraction of more common measures
like the ℓ2 distance, we guarantee that it contracts the coordinate-wise ℓ2 diameter. Fortunately,
using bounds between the ℓ2 distance and the coordinate-wise ℓ2 diameter, we show that iter-
ating algorithms with a guarantee of contraction of the coordinate-wise ℓ2 diameter guarantees
the contraction of the ℓ2 diameter. Interestingly, to prove our lower bounds on Byzantine re-
silience, we also leverage the powerful quasi-unanimity property implied by Byzantine averaging
agreement. It is also important to note that our algorithms only make use of building blocks
(i.e., trimmed mean and the minimum volume ellipsoid) that are well-known for having a linear
computation time with respect to the dimension d.
3
Related work
Approximate agreement. The problem of approximate agreement was introduced in [9],
where the goal is for all correct nodes to converge to values that are close to each other, while
all remaining in the range of the proposed values by correct nodes. Fekete [13] gave approxi-
mate agreement algorithms that achieve the optimal convergence rate in both synchronous [12]
and asynchronous environments [14]. Abraham et al. [1] improved the bound required on the
maximum number of Byzantine nodes in asynchronous environments and proved the derived
bound to be optimal. All proposed solutions were restricted to agreement on single-dimensional
values (scalars). In 2013, a solution to the multi-dimensional version of the same problem was
proposed [21], offering however rather pessimistic optimality results. Specifically, it was proven
in [21] that an nd local computation is required in each round, and Ω(d.f) correct nodes are
required. Such a prohibitive requirement on the number of correct nodes and local computa-
tion stems from the requirement of finding a solution in the convex hull formed by the correct
proposals. The authors showed that the problem is impossible with n < f(d+ 2).
In the context of mobile agents agreements, such as robots agreeing on a meeting point in
the plane (d = 2) or drones in the space2 (d = 3), the approximate agreement abstraction offers
an appealing relaxation of the exact agreement problem, which is impossible in asynchrony
and in the presence of faults [15]. In the context of modern machine learning however, the
dimensionality is often in the order of more than 108 and calls for linear computation time.
In this paper, we show that the collaborative learning problem can be reduced to an averaging
agreement problem, which requires weaker guarantees compared to the approximate agreement
problem: essentially, we do not require the solution to be in the convex hull formed by correct
replies. Thanks to this formulation, we manage to bring down the requirement on the number
of correct nodes from n > f(d + 2) to n > 3f , and only require linear computation time in d,
which is a crucial reduction given the value of d in machine learning.
Clearly, the collaborative learning problem can be also solved using the traditional consensus
abstraction [19]. Yet, this approach has at least three limitations. First, such a solution would
only be applicable to an eventually–synchronous environment, given the classical impossibility
result in asynchronous networks [15]. Second, the communication overhead of relaying the whole
learning state to each node is prohibitive, given the huge models (with d in order of millions or
billions parameters) used in nowadays ML applications. Third, though consensus will help the
learning task to converge, there is no guarantee on the quality of learning after convergence in
this approach, i.e., nodes may agree on a value that is proposed by a Byzantine node, and it is
impossible to detect such a behavior.
Byzantine centralized learning. Over the past three years, many proposals addressed
the Byzantine resilience problem in centralized settings, namely using the parameter server ar-
chitecture [20]. In such architecture, one trusted server holds the model parameters and a set of
workers do collectively the backpropagation algorithm [17], computing the gradients based on
their local data. This line of research resulted in a few techniques to tolerate Byzantine behavior
of nodes either using a statistically–robust gradient aggregation rule or using redundant gradient
computation and coding schemes. Three Median–based aggregation rules were proposed in the
literature to resist Byzantine attacks [24]. Krum [3] and its variant Multi-Krum used a distance–
based algorithm to eliminate Byzantine inputs and average the correct ones. Bulyan [11] pro-
posed a meta–algorithm to guarantee Byzantine resilience against a strong adversary that can
fool the aforementioned aggregation rules in high–dimensional spaces. Draco [7] used coding
schemes and redundant gradient computation for Byzantine resilience, where Detox [22] com-
bined coding schemes with Byzantine–resilient aggregation for better resilience and overhead
guarantees. Kardam [8] used filters to tolerate Byzantine workers, yet in asynchronous learning
setup. The main difference between these approaches and the algorithms we propose is that the
2These examples were used in [21] to justify the practicality of nd.
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latter do not require a central, trusted machine yet works completely in a decentralized setup.
Byzantine decentralized learning. Few papers [26, 25, 16] tackled the question of fault
tolerance in a decentralized learning setup, yet none of the proposed approaches considers a
genuine Byzantine faults model, in which the Byzantine nodes are omniscient (i.e., they assume
that the adversary is limited).
MOZI [16] uses two techniques to achieve Byzantine resilience: (1) a distance–based aggrega-
tion rule (e.g., Krum [3], Bulyan [11], or the Median [24]) and (2) a performance–based filtering
technique (choosing the models that achieve the smallest loss values). Such a technique relies on
the fact that Byzantine nodes will send models with high loss values. Such an assumption may
not be achieved in practical scenarios, where Byzantine nodes can craft poisoned models with
small loss values. Moreover, MOZI assumes that eventually models on correct nodes will not
drift among each others. Under genuine Byzantine settings, this assumption may not also hold
as Byzantine nodes may influence the correct models to drift away from each other. Moreover,
MOZI considers data to be i.i.d., and it considers only convex optimization.
BRIDGE [25] and ByRDiE [26] consider Byzantine resilience in decentralized settings for
both stochastic gradient descent (SGD) and stochastic coordinate descent (SCD) optimizations
respectively. Both rely on trimmed–mean to achieve Byzantine resilience, yet while also as-
suming that local convergence of each node independently (i.e., whatever the Byzantine attack
is, each node will be able to converge locally to a local minimum, i.e., g(t) = 0 with t large
enough). In addition, both proposals consider only convex optimization and assume data to be
i.i.d.
In a recent work [10], both genuinely Byzantine adversaries and decentralized parameter
servers were considered. While the Byzantine resilient solution in [10] is also decentralized, it
is not collaborative, in the sense that workers are assumed to draw from homogeneous, i.i.d,
distributions of data.
In short, the problem we address is different in that it combines three aspects: (1) we address
genuine Byzantine resilience with no assumptions on the behavior of Byzantine nodes, (2) we
address the more general case of non-convex optimization, and (3) we consider the more general
case of non–i.i.d. data, which has more application potential in peer-to-peer collaborative
settings.
2 Model and Assumptions
2.1 Model
We consider a set [n] = {1, . . . , n} of nodes, out of which h are honest and f = n − h are
Byzantine. For the sake of exposition we assume that the first h nodes are honest. But
crucially, no honest node knows which h − 1 other nodes are honest. The f Byzantine nodes
are omniscient but not omnipotent: they know each other (or are controlled by the same
unique adversary), can collude, and subsequently know who are the h remaining honest nodes.
Without loss of generality, we assume the Byzantine nodes to be controlled by a single adversary.
Such an adversary has access to all learning and deployment information, including the learning
objective, the employed algorithm, and the dataset. The adversary has also the ability to choose
which of the correct messages are delivered to which nodes. This can be done by overloading
some network links to delay the delivery of some messages, forcing the receiver node to disregard
messages from the targeted link. Yet, we assume that the adversary is not able to delay all
messages indefinitely [6], i.e., we assume each correct node is able to gather q ≤ n− f messages
in each iteration from other nodes. We also assume that the adversary is not able to alter the
replies of the correct nodes. Moreover, we assume that honest nodes can authenticate the source
of a message to prevent spoofing and Sybil attacks.
The Byzantine nodes’ inputs can be anything and can obviously differ from what honest
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node k 6= j receives. We denote by −−→Byz(j)(~x) =
(
Byz
(j,1)(~x), . . . ,Byz(j,q)(~x)
)
the family of
inputs (of size q) collected by node j. We thus know that there exists an injective function
τ : Q
(j)
t ∩ [h] → [q − f ], for Q(j)t the set of gradient estimates delivered to (correct) node j at
step t, such that Byz(j,τ(k)) = x(k). Table 1 lists all the notations we use throughout the paper.
Table 1: Notations used throughout the paper.
n Total number of nodes in the system
f Declared, maximal number of Byzantine nodes
h = n− f Number of honest nodes
q Number of queried nodes per communication step
d Dimension of the parameter space Rd
~x = (x(1), . . . , x(h)) Family of vectors, where x(j) ∈ Rd is the vector of node j
x¯ = 1h
∑
j∈[h] x
(j) Average of the vectors in family ~x.
θ
(j)
t Parameter vector (i.e., model) at node j at step t
L(j) Local loss function at node j
L¯ Average local loss, which is what we aim to minimize
∇L(j) (θ) Real local gradient of the loss loss L(j) at θ
g
(j)
t Stochastic estimation of the gradient made by node j at step t
L Lipschitz constant of the gradient of the loss function (smoothness constant)
ξ
(j)
t Gradient estimation error at the node j at step t, i.e., ξ
(j)
t = g
(j)
t −∇L(j)
(
θ
(j)
t
)
ηt Learning rate at step t
[h] (Without loss of generality) the indexes of the correct nodes
By default, and unless explicitly stated otherwise, we consider a general asynchronous dis-
tributed setting: we assume no bounds neither on communication delays between nodes nor on
the relative speeds of these nodes. We shall however sometimes discuss the case of a synchronous
setting where we would assume bounds on communication delays between honest nodes as well
as on their relative speeds. We also by consider the general heterogeneous case where local
distribution of data across nodes may vary.
2.2 Assumptions
To provide theoretical guarantees on collaborative learning, we make the following assumptions
on the loss function and on the gradient sampling.
Assumption 1. Loss functions are lower bounded. Without loss of generality, we assume that
they are nonnegative, i.e.
∀θ ∈ Rd, ∀j ∈ [h], L(j)(θ) ≥ 0. (1)
Assumption 2. The loss functions are L-smooth, i.e., there exists a constant L such that
∀θ, θ′ ∈ Rd, ∀j ∈ [h],
∥∥∥∇L(j) (θ)−∇L(j) (θ′)∥∥∥
2
≤ L ∣∣θ − θ′∣∣ . (2)
Assumption 3. The variance of the noise in the gradient estimations are bounded, i.e.
∀j ∈ [h], ∀θ(j)t ∈ Rd, E
ξ
(j)
t |~θt
∥∥∥ξ(j)t ∥∥∥2
2
≤ σ2t , (3)
where the expectation is taken over the random variable ξ
(j)
t conditioned on θ
(j)
t . Additionally,
we consider algorithm designs that guarantee3 σt → 0, as explained below.
3In fact, we assume that t 7→ σt is computable, and that the proof of σt → 0 is constructive, in the sense that
for any error ε > 0, we must be able to compute a time T such that for all t ≥ T , we have σt ≤ ε.
6
While the above assumption depends on the nature of the loss functions and on the data
sets, in practice, it also heavily depends on the batch sizes used by the local nodes to estimate
their gradients. Thus, we can actually reduce the value of σt by our algorithm design
4. In fact,
in the limit where nodes estimate gradients based on their entire local data sets, then we can
even guarantee σt = 0.
Note that the guarantee σt → 0 is critical our analysis, given that noisy gradient estimates
affect the diameter of local gradient estimates, and that larger diameters increase the Byzantines’
abilities to further bias the result of the distributed averaging agreement algorithms.
We will also rely on the following upper-bound assumption on the loss function, which will
be useful to provide finite-time guarantees.
Assumption 4. There is a computable bound Lmax such that at initial point θ1 ∈ Rd, for any
honest node j ∈ [h], we have L(j)(θ1) ≤ Lmax.
In practice, for classification tasks, each coordinate of the input vector is bounded by con-
struction (e.g. for RGB image, each coordinate can represent a color intensity with a value in
[0, 1]; each coordinate of the input images is bounded between 0 and 1). The same applies for
the expected outputs (e.g. one-hot encoding of the expected class). Then, assuming continuity
of the model transfer function at any input (e.g. any neural network using solely continuous
transfer functions is continuous), the output of the model is also bounded coordinate-wise. As-
suming continuity of the loss function at any model output and expected output (e.g. mean
squared error and cross-entropy losses), the loss is then also bounded above and below.
Finally, note that in sections 5, 6 and 7, we will present different solutions to the averag-
ing agreement problem. These algorithms differ according to their Byzantine tolerance, their
averaging constant, their communication complexity and their cryptographic assumptions. For
the sake of simplicity of exposition, we shall detail the specific assumptions needed for each
algorithm directly in the respective sections.
3 The Averaging Agreement Problem
Before defining the problem, we first define some useful concepts related to diameters.
3.1 Diameters
In particular, we need to measure the spread of different sets of vectors.
Definition 1. For any r ∈ [1,∞], we define the ℓr-diameter of a family ~x ∈ Rd·h of vectors
x(j) ∈ Rd as the diameter in ℓr-norm, i.e.
∆r (~x) = max
j,k∈[h]
∥∥∥x(j) − x(k)∥∥∥
r
. (4)
We also define the diameter along coordinate i by
∆cw(~x)[i] = max
j,k∈[h]
∣∣∣x(j)[i]− x(k)[i]∣∣∣ , (5)
and the coordinate-wise ℓr-diameters by ∆
cw
r (~x) = ‖∆cw(~x)‖r.
In the sequel, we focus on lists of vectors like ~θ and ~g. Interestingly, we have the following
bounds between diameters.
4Equivalently, we can make a large number of independent queries of local gradient estimates to reduce the
variance of the estimator.
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Lemma 1. The ℓr-diameters are upper-bounded by coordinate-wise ℓr-diameters, i.e.,
∀r, ∆r ≤ ∆cwr ≤ min
{
d1/r, 2h1/r
}
∆r. (6)
Note that in machine learning applications, we usually expect d ≫ h, in which case the more
relevant right-hand side inequality is ∆cwr ≤ 2h1/r∆r.
Proof. Consider j∗, k∗ ∈ [h] such that ∆r(~x) =
∥∥x(j∗) − x(k∗)∥∥
r
. But then, we note that on each
coordinate i ∈ [d], ∣∣∣x(j∗)[i]− x(k∗)[i]∣∣∣ ≤ max
j,k∈[h]
∣∣∣x(j)[i]− x(k)[i]∣∣∣ = ∆cw(x)[i]. (7)
As a result, ∆r(~x) =
∥∥x(j∗) − x(k∗)∥∥
r
≤ ‖∆cw(~x)‖r = ∆cwr (~x). For the right-hand side, first
note that a coordinate-wise diameter is smaller than the ℓr diameter, which yields
∆cwr (~x)
r =
∑
i∈[d]
max
j,k∈[h]
∣∣∣x(j)[i]− x(k)[i]∣∣∣r ≤∑
i∈[d]
max
j,k∈[h]
∥∥∥x(j) − x(k)∥∥∥r
r
(8)
=
∑
i∈[d]
∆r(~x)
r = d∆r(~x)
r. (9)
Taking the r-th root shows that ∆cwr ≤ d1/r∆r. What is left to prove is that ∆cwr ≤ 2h1/r∆r.
To prove this, note that for any i ∈ [d], we have
max
j,k∈[h]
∣∣∣x(j)[i]− x(k)[i]∣∣∣ ≤ max
j∈[h]
(
2
∣∣∣x(j)[i]− x(1)[i]∣∣∣) . (10)
Indeed, assuming the former maximum is reached for j∗ and k∗, the latter maximum will be
reached for j∗ or k∗, depending on whether x(1)[i] is closer to x(j∗)[i] or x(k∗)[i]. In either case,
the above inequality holds. As a result,
∆cwr (~x)
r =
∑
i∈[d]
max
j,k∈[h]
∣∣∣x(j)[i]− x(k)[i]∣∣∣r ≤∑
i∈[d]
max
j∈[h]
(
2
∣∣∣x(j)[i]− x(1)[i]∣∣∣)r (11)
= 2r
∑
i∈[d]
max
j∈[h]
∣∣∣x(j)[i]− x(1)[i]∣∣∣r ≤ 2r ∑
i∈[d]
∑
j∈[h]
∣∣∣x(j)[i]− x(1)[i]∣∣∣r (12)
= 2r
∑
j∈[h]
∑
i∈[d]
∣∣∣x(j)[i]− x(1)[i]∣∣∣r = 2r ∑
j∈[h]
∥∥∥x(j) − x(1)∥∥∥r
r
(13)
≤ 2r
∑
j∈[h]
∆r(~x)
r = 2rh∆r(~x)
r. (14)
Taking the r-th root yields ∆cwr ≤ 2h1/r∆r, which concludes the proof.
As an immediate corollary, asymptotic agreement (Definition 2, below) is equivalent to
showing that any of the diameters we introduce in this section goes to zero.
Interestingly, our diameters satisfy the triangle inequality, as shown by the following lemma.
Lemma 2. The diameters and coordinate-wise diameters satisfy the triangle inequality. Namely,
for any two families of vectors ~x and ~y, we have the following inequality
∆cw(~x + ~y) ≤ ∆cw(~x) + ∆cw(~y). (15)
As an immediate corollary, by triangle inequality of norms, for any r ∈ [1,∞], we also have
∆cwr (~x + ~y) ≤ ∆cwr (~x) + ∆cwr (~y). We also have ∆r(~x + ~y) ≤ ∆r(~x) + ∆r(~y).
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Proof. For any coordinate i ∈ [d], the following holds:
∆cw(~x + ~y)[i] = max
j,k∈[h]
∣∣∣x(j)[i] + y(j)[i]− x(k)[i]− y(k)[i]∣∣∣ (16)
≤ max
j,k∈[h]
{∣∣∣x(j)[i]− x(k)[i]∣∣∣+ ∣∣∣y(j)[i]− y(k)[i]∣∣∣} (17)
≤ max
j,k∈[h]
∣∣∣x(j)[i]− x(k)[i]∣∣∣+ max
j′,k′∈[h]
∣∣∣y(j′)[i]− y(k′)[i]∣∣∣ (18)
= ∆cw(~x)[i] + ∆cw(~y)[i], (19)
which concludes the proof for coordinate-wise diameters. The proof for ℓr diameters is similar.
3.2 Definitions
We first define the concept of asymptotic agreement in our context.
Definition 2. A distributed algorithm Avg achieves Byzantine-resilient asymptotic agreement
if it guarantees a contraction of the ℓ2 diameter of the vectors. More precisely, a Byzantine-
resilient agreement Avg takes as input an input t ∈ N, and must guarantee that , for any family
~x ∈ Rd·h and any Byzantine attack −−→Byzt, we have
∆2
(−−→
Avgt ◦
−−→
Byzt(~x)
)
≤ ∆2 (~x)
2t
. (20)
Note that the algorithm Avgt can include several communications (and local computations)
rounds, whose details may depend on the input t.
Clearly, by taking t→∞, an asymptotic agreement algorithm guarantees that the diameter
of vectors’ parameters converges to zero. This explains the terminology “asymptotic agreement”.
Note that the trivial agreement algorithm which consists of simply outputting 0 indepen-
dently from the inputs achieves asymptotic agreement. However this algorithm is intuitively
useless for machine learning applications (as well as other non-trivial distributed applications),
where ~x would contain model parameters or gradients that should obviously not all be discarded.
We thus formalize below another desirable requirement for agreement in our context.
Definition 3. A distributed vector aggregation algorithm Avg achieves Byzantine-resilient C-
averaging if, for any step t ∈ N, the average of honest nodes’ vectors is not far from the average
of honest nodes’ initial vectors. Namely, Avg is Byzantine-resilient C-averaging if C ∈ R
exists such that, for any vector family ~x ∈ Rd·h and any Byzantine attack −−→Byzt, denoting
~xt ,
−−→
Avgt ◦
−−→
Byzt(~x), ~x0 , ~x, we guarantee
‖x¯t − x¯‖2 ≤ C∆2 (~x) , (21)
where x¯t =
1
h
∑
j∈[h] x
(j)
t is the average of honest nodes’ vectors. We simply say that an algorithm
achieves averaging if there exists a constant C for which it is C-averaging.
The problem of averaging agreement is thus that of designing a Byzantine-resilient algo-
rithm Avg that achieves both C-averaging and asymptotic agreement. We then say that Avg
guarantees Byzantine-resilient C-averaging agreement.
Note that this definition also allows the use of randomized algorithms We say that a random-
ized algorithm Avg solves Byzantine-resilient averaging agreement if for any t ∈ N, denoting
x¯t ,
−−→
Avgt ◦
−−→
Byzt (~x), we have the guarantee:
E∆2(~xt)
2 ≤ ∆2(~x)
2
4t
and E ‖x¯t − x¯‖22 ≤ C2∆2(~x)2, (22)
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where the expectations are taken over the randomness introduced by the randomized algorithm
Avg. Note that any deterministic algorithm achieves averaging agreement in the deterministic
sense if and only if it does so in this randomized sense. The use of squares also turns out to
be critical for the proof of equivalence between averaging agreement and collaborative learning
(see Section 4.4).
4 Collaborative Learning
4.1 The Problem
We now define the collaborative learning problem we address in this paper. We assume that
each node has a local loss function that may differ from other nodes’ local losses, i.e., we consider
the general heterogeneous case. We denote by L(j) : θ 7→ L(j) (θ) the local loss of node j. Our
goal is to minimize the global loss, obtained by averaging local losses as follows:
L(~θ) , 1
h
∑
j∈[h]
L¯
(
θ(j)
)
=
1
h2
∑
j∈[h]
∑
k∈[h]
L(k)
(
θ(j)
)
. (23)
More precisely, we aim to guarantee the following properties.
Definition 4. An algorithm Learn solves the Byzantine-resilient C-collaborative learning prob-
lem if, given any local losses L(j) for j ∈ [h] satisfying assumptions (1,2,3,4) and some δ > 0,
Learn outputs a vector family ~θ of honest nodes such that
E
~ξ
∆2(~θ)
2 ≤ δ2 and E
~ξ
∥∥∇L¯ (θ¯)∥∥2
2
≤ (1 + δ)2C2K2, (24)
where K is the largest difference between local gradients, i.e.
K , sup
j,k∈[h]
sup
θ∈Rd
∥∥∥∇L(j) (θ)−∇L(k) (θ)∥∥∥
2
. (25)
The main result of the next two sections is that C-collaborative learning is equivalent to
C-averaging agreement.
4.2 From averaging agreement to collaborative learning
We present here a reduction from collaborative learning to averaging agreement. In particular,
we consider an algorithm Avg that solves Byzantine-resilient C-averaging agreement and we
use Avg to design a Byzantine-resilient collaborative learning algorithm Learn. Recall that
Learn must take a constant δ > 0 as input, which determines the degree of agreement and
learning guarantee that Learn must achieve.
All correct parameter vectors are initialized with the same random values (i.e., ∀j ∈ [h], θ(j)1 =
θ1) using a predefined seed s. At round t, each honest node j ∈ [h] first computes a local gradi-
ent estimate g
(j)
t given its local loss function L(j) (·) and its local parameters θ(j)t . But instead
of performing a learning step with this gradient estimate, Avg is run on all local gradients.
Recall from Definition 2 that Avg depends on a parameter which defines how close we want
to be from agreement. We set this parameter at τ∞t , ⌈log2 t⌉, so that 1/2τ
∞
t ≤ 1/t. Denoting
~γt ,
−−→
Avgτ∞t
◦ −−→Byzt,g(~g), we then have the following guarantee:
E
Avg|~gt
∆2 (~γt)
2 ≤ ∆2 (~gt)
2
t2
and E
Avg|~gt
‖γ¯t − g¯t‖22 ≤ C2∆2 (~gt)2 . (26)
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The averaged gradient estimate γ
(j)
t is then used to update node j’s parameters, as
θ
(j)
t+1/2 = θ
(j)
t − ηγ(j)t , (27)
for a fixed learning rate η , δ/12L. But before moving on to the next round, we run once
again Avg, yet with its parameter set to 1. Moreover, this time, Avg is run on local nodes’
parameters. Denoting ~θt+1 =
−−→
Avg1 ◦
−−→
Byzt,θ
(
~θt+1/2
)
, we then have the guarantee
E
Avg|~θt
∆2
(
~θt+1
)2
≤
∆2(~θt+1/2)
2
4
, (28)
and
E
Avg|~θ
t+1/2
∥∥∥θ¯t+1 − θ¯t+1/2∥∥∥2
2
≤ C2∆2(~θt+1/2)2. (29)
Note that all guarantees above hold for any (possibly distinct) Byzantine attacks. On input
δ, Learn then runs T , T (δ) rounds. The function T (δ) will be given implicitly in the proof
of our theorem, where we will stress the fact that it can be computed from the inputs of the
problem5 (L, K, C, n, f , σt, Lmax and δ). Finally, instead of returning ~θT (δ), Learn chooses
uniformly randomly a time ∗ ∈ [T (δ)] and returns the vector family ~θ∗.
We recapitulate the local execution of Learn (at each node) in Algorithm 1.
Data: Local loss gradient oracle
Result: Model parameters θt
1 Initialize local parameters θ1 using a fixed seed s;
2 Fix learning rate η , δ/12L;
3 Fix number of round T , TLearn(δ);
4 for t← 1, . . . , T do
5 gt ← GradientOracle(θt);
6 γt ← Avgτ∞t ◦Byzt,g(~gt) // Vulnerable to Byzantine attacks
7 θt+1/2 ← θt − ηγt;
8 θt+1 ← Avg1 ◦Byzt,θ
(
~θt+1/2
)
// Vulnerable to Byzantine attacks
9 end
10 Draw ∗ ∼ U([T ]);
11 Return θ∗;
Algorithm 1: Learn execution on an honest node.
Remark 1. In practice, it may be more efficient to return the last computed vector family,
though our proof applies only to a randomly selected time.
Remark 2. It is important to notice that we assume all nodes agree on ∗. This can be achieved
for instance by launching the algorithm with a seed to be used by a predetermined pseudo-random
number generator by all honest nodes.
4.3 Proof of the reduction
Preliminary lemmas
Lemma 3. For any α > 0 and any two vectors u and v, we have
‖u+ v‖22 ≤ (1 + α−1) ‖u‖22 + (1 + α) ‖v‖22 . (30)
5Note that it also requires the proof of σt → 0 to be constructive, in the sense that for any error ε > 0, we
must be able to compute a time T such that for all t ≥ T , we have σt ≤ ε.
11
As an immediate corollary, for any two families ~u and ~v of vectors, we have
∆2 (~u + ~v)
2 ≤ (1 + α−1)∆2 (~u)2 + (1 + α)∆2 (~v)2 . (31)
Proof. We have the following inequalities:
(1 + α−1) ‖u‖22 + (1 + α) ‖v‖22 − ‖u+ v‖22 = α−1 ‖u‖22 + α ‖v‖22 − 2u · v (32)
=
∥∥∥α−1/2u− α1/2v∥∥∥2
2
≥ 0. (33)
Rearranging the terms yields the lemma.
Lemma 4. For any vector family u1, . . . , uN , we have∥∥∥∥∥∥
∑
j∈[N ]
uj
∥∥∥∥∥∥
2
2
≤ N
∑
j∈[N ]
‖uj‖22 . (34)
As an immediate corollary, for any family of vector families ~u1 , . . . , ~uN , we have
∆2
(∑
~uj
)2
≤ N
∑
j∈[N ]
∆2
(
~uj
)2
. (35)
Proof. Notice that u 7→ ‖u‖22 is a convex function. As a result,∥∥∥∥∥∥ 1N
∑
j∈[N ]
uj
∥∥∥∥∥∥
2
2
≤ 1
N
∑
j∈[N ]
‖uj‖22 . (36)
Multiplying both sides by N2 allows to conclude.
Lemma 5. For any vector family ~u ∈ Rd·h, we have
∆2(~u) ≤ 2max
j∈[h]
∥∥∥u(j)∥∥∥
2
. (37)
Proof. We have the inequalities
∆2(~u) = max
j,k∈[h]
∥∥∥u(j) − u(k)∥∥∥
2
≤ max
j,k∈[h]
∥∥∥u(j)∥∥∥
2
+
∥∥∥u(k)∥∥∥
2
(38)
= max
j∈[h]
∥∥∥u(j)∥∥∥
2
+max
k∈[h]
∥∥∥u(k)∥∥∥
2
= 2max
j∈[h]
∥∥∥u(j)∥∥∥
2
, (39)
which is the lemma.
We now prove that Learn solves collaborative learning. Note that all the proofs depend on
some quantity αt, which will eventually be defined as αt , max
{
1/
√
t, σt
}
. Note that we then
have αt ≤ α¯ , max {1, σ¯}, where σ¯ is an upper-bound on σt, which is finite since6 σt → 0.
Lemma 6. Under assumptions (3), for any 0 < αt ≤ α¯, we have the following bound on the
expected ℓ2 diameter of gradients:
E
~ξt|~θt
∆2 (~gt)
2 ≤ (1 + αt)K2 + 16α¯α−1t
(
L2∆2(~θt)
2 + hσ2t
)
. (40)
6Note that we can compute σ¯ given a constructive proof of σt → 0. Indeed, this proof allows to identify a
time t0 such that σt ≤ 1 for all t ≥ t0. Taking σ¯ , max {σ1:t0 , 1} yields an upper bound.
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Proof. Note that we have
g
(j)
t = ∇L(j)
(
θ
(j)
t
)
+ ξ
(j)
t (41)
= ∇L(j) (θ¯t)+ ((∇L(j) (θ(j)t )−∇L(j) (θ¯t))+ ξ(j)t ) . (42)
Applying Lemma 3 with α = α−1t , and then Lemma 4 to the last terms then yields
∆2 (~gt)
2 ≤ (1 + αt)∆2
(−→∇L (θ¯t))2 (43)
+ (1 + α−1t )
(
2∆2
(−→∇L~θt −−→∇Lθ¯t)2 + 2∆2 (~ξt)2
)
. (44)
Note that
∆2
(−→∇L (θ¯t))2 = max
j,k∈[h]
∥∥∥∇L(j) (θ¯t)−∇L(k) (θ¯t)∥∥∥2
2
≤ K2. (45)
The second term can be controlled using Lemma 5, which yields
∆2
(−→∇L(~θt)−−→∇L (θ¯t)) ≤ 2max
j∈[h]
∥∥∥∇L(j) (θ(j)t )−∇L(j) (θ¯t)∥∥∥
2
(46)
≤ 2max
j∈[h]
L
∥∥∥θ(j)t − θ¯t∥∥∥
2
≤ 2L∆2(~θt). (47)
To bound the third term, first note that Lemma 5 implies that ∆2(~ξt) ≤ 2maxj∈[h]
∥∥∥ξ(j)t ∥∥∥
2
.
Thus,
E
~ξt|~θt
∆2(~ξt)
2 ≤ 4 E
~ξt|~θt
max
j∈[h]
∥∥∥ξ(j)t ∥∥∥2
2
≤ 4 E
~ξt|~θt
∑
j∈[h]
∥∥∥ξ(j)t ∥∥∥2
2
(48)
= 4h E
~ξt|~θt
∥∥∥ξ(j)t ∥∥∥2
2
≤ 4hσ2t . (49)
Combining it all, and using 1+α−1t ≤ (α¯+1)α−1t ≤ 2α¯α−1t for αt ≤ α¯ and α¯ = max {1, σ¯} ≥ 1,
yields the result.
We define the effective gradient G
(j)
t of node j at round t as G
(j)
t , − 1η
(
θ
(j)
t+1 − θ(j)t
)
. The
average effective gradient G¯t is then the average of honest nodes’ effective gradients.
Lemma 7. Under assumptions (2, 3), for any 0 < αt ≤ α¯, the expected discrepancy between the
average effective gradient and the true gradient at the average parameter is bounded as follows:
E
ξt,Avg|~θt
∥∥G¯t −∇L¯ (θ¯t)∥∥22 ≤ (1 + αt)C2 E
ξt|~θt
∆2 (~gt)
2
+ 6α¯α−1t
[
σ2t
h
+
(
L2 +
2C2
η2
)
∆2
(
~θt
)2
+
2C2
t2
E
ξt|~θt
∆2 (~gt)
2
]
. (50)
Proof. Note that
θ¯t+1 − θ¯t = (θ¯t+1 − θ¯t+1/2) + (θ¯t+1/2 − θ¯t) (51)
= (θ¯t+1 − θ¯t+1/2)− ηγ¯t (52)
As a result G¯t = g¯t + (γ¯t − g¯t)− 1η (θ¯t+1 − θ¯t+1/2). Moreover, we have
g¯t =
1
h
∑
j∈[h]
∇L(j)
(
θ
(j)
t
)
+
1
h
∑
j∈[h]
ξ
(j)
t (53)
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= ∇L (θ¯t)+ 1h ∑
j∈[h]
(
∇L(j)
(
θ
(j)
t
)
−∇L(j) (θ¯t))+ 1h ∑
j∈[h]
ξ
(j)
t , (54)
where ∇L (θ¯t) = 1h∑j∈[h]∇L(j) (θ¯t) is the average gradient at the average parameter. This
then yields:
G¯t −∇L
(
θ¯t
)
=
1
h
∑
j∈[h]
(
∇L(j)
(
θ
(j)
t
)
−∇L(j) (θ¯t))+ 1h ∑
j∈[h]
ξ
(j)
t
+
1
η
(
θ¯t+1/2 − θ¯t+1
)
+ (γ¯t − g¯t) . (55)
Applying Lemma 3 for α = αt (by isolating the first three terms), and then Lemma 4 to the
first three terms then yields
∥∥G¯t −∇L (θ¯t)∥∥22 ≤ 3(1 + α−1t )
∥∥∥∥∥∥1h
∑
j∈[h]
(
∇L(j)
(
θ
(j)
t
)
−∇L(j) (θ¯t))
∥∥∥∥∥∥
2
2
+ 3(1 + α−1t )
∥∥∥∥∥∥ 1h
∑
j∈[h]
ξ
(j)
t
∥∥∥∥∥∥
2
2
+
3(1 + α−1t )
η2
∥∥∥θ¯t+1/2 − θ¯t+1∥∥∥2
2
+ (1 + αt) ‖γ¯t − g¯t‖22 . (56)
We now note that the expectation of each term can be bounded. Indeed,∥∥∥∥∥∥1h
∑
j∈[h]
(
∇L(j)
(
θ
(j)
t
)
−∇L(j) (θ¯t))
∥∥∥∥∥∥
2
≤ 1
h
∑
j∈[h]
∥∥∥∇L(j) (θ(j)t )−∇L(j) (θ¯t)∥∥∥
2
(57)
≤ 1
h
∑
j∈[h]
L
∥∥∥θ(j)t − θ¯t∥∥∥
2
≤ 1
h
∑
j∈[h]
L∆2(~θt) = L∆2(
~θt). (58)
Moreover, using the conditional non-correlation of ξ
(j)
t , we have
E
ξt|~θt
∥∥∥∥∥∥1h
∑
j∈[h]
ξ
(j)
t
∥∥∥∥∥∥
2
2
= E
ξt|~θt
1
h2
∑
j,k∈[h]
ξ
(j)
t · ξ(k)t =
1
h2
∑
j,k∈[h]
E
ξt|~θt
ξ
(j)
t · ξ(k)t (59)
=
1
h2
∑
j∈[h]
E
ξt|~θt
∥∥∥ξ(j)t ∥∥∥2
2
≤ 1
h2
∑
j∈[h]
σ2t =
σ2t
h
. (60)
For the third term, we use the C-averaging guarantee of Avg to obtain
E
Avg|~θ
t+1/2
∥∥∥θ¯t+1 − θ¯t+1/2∥∥∥2
2
≤ C2∆2(~θt+1/2)2. (61)
Since ~θt+1/2 =
~θt − η~γt, Lemma 4 then implies
E
Avg|~θt
∥∥∥θ¯t+1 − θ¯t+1/2∥∥∥2
2
≤ 2C2∆2(~θt)2 + 2C2η2 E
Avg|~θt
∆2(~γt)
2 (62)
≤ 2C2∆2(~θt)2 + 2C2η2
∆2(~gt)
2
t2
(63)
Finally, for the last term, we use again the C-averaging guarantee of the aggregation Avg:
E
Avg|~θt
‖γ¯t − g¯t‖22 ≤ C2∆2(~gt)2. (64)
Combining it all and using 1 + α−1t ≤ 2α¯α−1t finally yields the lemma.
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Lemma 8. Under assumptions (2, 3), for 0 < αt ≤ α¯ and αt ≥ 1/
√
t, there exists constants A
and B which can be computed explicitly given α¯, C, L, h and η, such that
E
ξt|~θt
∥∥G¯t −∇L¯ (θ¯t)∥∥22 ≤ (1 + αt)2 (1 + κt)C2K2 + α−1t (A∆2(~θt)2 +Bσ2t ) , (65)
where κt ≤ 12C2K2/
√
t→ 0.
Proof. Combining the two previous lemmas, this bound can be guaranteed by setting
κt =
12C2K2
(1 + αt)αtt
(66)
At = 8(1 + αt)C
2L2 + 3L2 +
6C2
η2
+
96C2L2
αtt
(67)
Bt = 8(1 + αt)C
2h+
3
h
+
96C2h
αtt
. (68)
Assumptions 0 < αt ≤ α¯ (which implies 1 + αt ≤ 2α¯) and αt
√
t ≥ 1 allow to conclude, with
κt ≤ 12C
2K2√
t
→ 0 (69)
A = 16α¯C2L2 + 3L2 +
6C2
η2
+ 96C2L2 (70)
B = 16α¯C2h+
3
h
+ 96C2h. (71)
This shows in particular that A and B can indeed be computed from the different constants of
the problem.
Lemma 9. We have the following bound on parameter drift:
E
Avg|~θt,~gt
∆2(~θt+1)
2 ≤ 1
2
∆2(~θt)
2 +
η2
2t2
∆2(~gt)
2. (72)
Proof. Recall that ~θt+1 =
−−→
Avg1 ◦
−−→
Byzt,θ(
~θt+1/2). Thus, by the asymptotic agreement property
of Avg1, we know that
E
Avg|~θt,~gt
∆2(~θt+1)
2 ≤ 1
4
∆2(~θt+1/2)
2. (73)
Now recall that ~θt+1/2 =
~θt − η~γt. Applying Lemma 3 for α = 1 thus yields
∆2(~θt+1/2)
2 ≤ 2∆2(~θt)2 + 2η2∆2(~γt)2. (74)
We now use the asymptotic agreement property of Avgτ∞t , which yields
E
Avg|~θt,~gt
∆2(~γt)
2 ≤ ∆2(~gt)
2
t2
. (75)
Combining it all then yields the result.
Lemma 10. Under assumptions (2, 3), 0 < αt ≤ α¯ and αt = max
{
1/
√
t, σt
}
, there exists a
constant D such that
E
~ξ1:t
∆2(~θt)
2 ≤ D/t2. (76)
Note that the constant D can be computed from the constants L, η, K, h and the functions σt
and αt.
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Proof. Denote ut = E~ξ1:t
∆2(~θt)
2. Combining Lemmas 6 and 9 yields
ut+1 ≤ ρtut + δt, (77)
where ρt and δt are given by
ρt ,
1
2
+
8L2η2
αtt2
(78)
δt ,
η2
2t2
(
(1 + αt)K
2 + 16α−1t hσ
2
t
)
. (79)
Given that 0 ≤ αt ≤ 1 and αt ≥ 1/
√
t, we know that ρt ≤ 12 + 8L2η2t−3/2. Thus, for t ≥ t0 ,(
32L2η2
)2/3
, we know that ρt ≤ ρ , 3/4. Moreover, given the same assumptions and using now
αt ≥ σt, we know that
δt ≤ δ+t ,
η2
t2
(
K2 + 8hσ¯
)
, (80)
where σ¯ , supσt. Note that δ
+
t = supτ≥t δτ is decreasing. In particular, for t ≥ t0 we now have
ut+1 ≤ ρut + δ+t . (81)
By induction we see that, for t ≥ 0, we have
ut+t0 ≤ ρtut0 +
t−1∑
τ=0
ρτδ+t+t0−τ−1. (82)
We now separate the sum into two parts. Calling t1 the separation point yields for t1 ≥ 0, and
using the fact that δ+t is decreasing yields
ut+t0 ≤ ρtut0 +
t1−1∑
τ=0
ρτδ+t+t0−τ−1 +
t−1∑
τ=t1
ρτδ+t+t0−τ−1 (83)
≤ ρtut0 + δ+t+t0−t1
t1−1∑
τ=0
ρτ + δ+t0
t−1∑
τ=t1
ρτ (84)
≤ ρtut0 + δ+t+t0−t1
∞∑
τ=0
ρτ + δ+t0
∞∑
τ=t1
ρτ (85)
≤ ρtut0 +
δ+t+t0−t1
1− ρ +
ρt1δ+t0
1− ρ (86)
= ρtut0 + 4δ
+
t+t0−t1 + 4ρ
t1δ+t0 . (87)
We now take t1 =
⌊
t+t0
2
⌋
. As a result,
δ+t+t0−t1 = δ
+⌈
t+t0
2
⌉ ≤ 4η
2
(t+ t0)2
(
K2 + 8hσ¯
)
. (88)
Now note that ut0 can be upper-bounded given L, η, α1:t0 , K, h and σ1:t, by computing vt0
defined by v0 = 0 and vt+1 = ρtvt + δt. Indeed, by induction we then clearly have ut0 ≤ vt0 ,
and thus the bound
ut+t0 ≤
16η2(K2 + 8hσ¯)
(t+ t0)2
+ ρtvt0 + 4ρ
t1δ+t0 , (89)
where the right-hand side is perfectly computable given the constants of the problem. Given
that ρt1 = O(1/t2) and ρt = O(1/t2), we can also compute a constant D from these constants,
such that for all times t, we have ut ≤ D/t2.
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Theorem 1. Under assumptions (1, 2, 3, 4), given a C-averaging agreement oracle, on any
input 0 < δ < 3, Learn solves Byzantine-resilient (1 + δ)C-collaborative learning. In other
words, denoting ~θ∗ the output of Learn, we have
E∆2
(
~θ∗
)2
≤ δ2 andE
∥∥∇L¯ (θ¯∗)∥∥22 ≤ (1 + δ)2C2K2. (90)
Proof. At any time t, Taylor’s theorem implies the existence of λ ∈ [0, 1] such that
L¯ (θ¯t+1) = L¯ (θ¯t − ηG¯t) (91)
= L¯ (θ¯t)− ηG¯t · ∇L¯ (θ¯t)+ 12 (ηG¯t)T ∇2L¯ (θ¯t − ληG¯t) (ηG¯t) . (92)
Lipschitz continuity of the gradient implies that ∇2L¯ (θ¯t − ληG¯t)  LI, which thus implies
L¯ (θ¯t+1) ≤ L¯ (θ¯t)− ηG¯t · ∇L¯ (θ¯t)+ Lη22 ∥∥G¯t∥∥22 . (93)
For the second term, using the inequality 2u · v ≥ −‖u‖22 − ‖v‖22, note that
G¯t · ∇L¯
(
θ¯t
)
=
(
G¯t −∇L¯
(
θ¯t
)
+∇L¯ (θ¯t)) · ∇L¯ (θ¯t) (94)
=
(
G¯t −∇L¯
(
θ¯t
)) · ∇L¯ (θ¯t)+ ∥∥∇L¯ (θ¯t)∥∥22 (95)
≥ −1
2
∥∥G¯t −∇L¯ (θ¯t)∥∥22 − 12 ∥∥∇L¯ (θ¯t)∥∥22 + ∥∥∇L¯ (θ¯t)∥∥22 (96)
= −1
2
∥∥G¯t −∇L¯ (θ¯t)∥∥22 + 12 ∥∥∇L¯ (θ¯t)∥∥22 . (97)
For the last term, we use ‖a+ b‖22 ≤ 2 ‖a‖22 + 2 ‖b‖22 to derive∥∥G¯t∥∥22 = ∥∥G¯t −∇L¯ (θ¯t)+∇L¯ (θ¯t)∥∥22 (98)
≤ 2∥∥G¯t −∇L¯ (θ¯t)∥∥22 + 2∥∥∇L¯ (θ¯t)∥∥22 . (99)
Combining the two above bounds into Equation (93) yields
L¯ (θ¯t+1) ≤ L¯ (θ¯t)− (η2 − Lη2
)∥∥∇L¯ (θ¯t)∥∥22 + (η2 + Lη2
) ∥∥G¯t −∇L¯ (θ¯t)∥∥22 . (100)
Rearranging the terms then yields(η
2
− Lη2
)∥∥∇L¯ (θ¯t)∥∥22 ≤ L¯ (θ¯t)− L¯ (θ¯t+1)+ (η2 + Lη2
)∥∥G¯t −∇L¯ (θ¯t)∥∥22 . (101)
We now use the fact that η ≤ δ/12L. Denoting ν , δ/6, this implies that η2 −Lη2 ≥ (1− ν)η/2
and η2 + Lη
2 ≤ (1 + ν)η/2. As a result,
∥∥∇L¯ (θ¯t)∥∥22 ≤ 4η (L¯ (θ¯t)− L¯ (θ¯t+1))+ 1 + ν1− ν ∥∥G¯t −∇L¯ (θ¯t)∥∥22 . (102)
Taking the expectation and the average over t ∈ [T ] yields
E
~ξ1:T
1
T
∑
t∈[T ]
∥∥∇L¯ (θ¯t)∥∥22 ≤ 4(L¯
(
θ¯1
)− L¯ (θ¯T+1))
ηT
+
1 + ν
1− ν
1
T
∑
t∈[T ]
E
~ξ1:T
∥∥G¯t −∇L¯ (θ¯t)∥∥22 . (103)
Note that E~ξ1:T
1
T
∑
t∈[T ]
∥∥∇L¯ (θ¯t)∥∥22 = E∥∥∇L¯ (θ¯∗)∥∥22, since the second term is obtained by
taking uniformly randomly one of the values averaged in the first term. Using also the fact that
L¯ (θ¯T+1) ≥ infθ L¯ (θ) ≥ 0 (Assumption 1) and L(j)(θ1) ≤ Lmax, we then obtain
E
∥∥∇L¯ (θ¯∗)∥∥22 ≤ 4LmaxηT + 1 + ν1− ν 1T ∑
t∈[T ]
E
~ξ1:T
∥∥G¯t −∇L¯ (θ¯t)∥∥22 . (104)
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Now recall that all nodes started with the same value θ1, and thus knows θ¯1. As a result, each
node j can compute L(j)(θ¯1), but it cannot compute L¯
(
θ¯1
)
.
Let us focus on the last term. Taking Lemma 8 and averaging over all noises ~ξ1:t yields
E
~ξ1:t
∥∥G¯t −∇L¯ (θ¯t)∥∥22 ≤ (1 + αt)2 (1 + κt)C2K2 + α−1t
(
A E
~ξ1:t
∆2(~θt)
2 +Bσ2t
)
. (105)
Recall that, by Lemma 10, E~ξ1:t
∆2(~θt)
2 ≤ D/t2. Recall also that αt , max
{
1/
√
t, σt
}
and
κt ≤ 12C2K2/
√
t. Then we obtain
E
~ξ1:t
∥∥G¯t −∇L¯ (θ¯t)∥∥22 ≤ (1 + αt)2
(
1 +
12C2K2√
t
)
C2K2 +
AD
t3/2
+Bσt. (106)
Now we can compute a time T1 such that for t ≥ T1, we have σt ≤ min
{
ν, νC2K2/B
}
. Defining
T2 , 144C
4K4/ν2 and T3 , (AD/νC
2K2)2/3, for t ≥ T4 , max {T1, T2, T3}, we have
E
~ξ1:t
∥∥G¯t −∇L¯ (θ¯t)∥∥22 ≤ (1 + ν)3C2K2 + νC2K2 + νC2K2 (107)
≤ (1 + 7ν)C2K2, (108)
using the inequality ν ≤ 1/2 to show that (1+ν)3 ≤ 1+3ν+3ν2+ν3 ≤ 1+3ν+3ν/2+ν/4 ≤ 1+5ν.
If we now average this quantity over time t from 1 to T , assuming T ≥ T4, we can separate the
sum from 1 to T4, and the sum from T4 + 1 to T . This yields
1
T
∑
t∈T
E
~ξ1:t
∥∥G¯t −∇L¯ (θ¯t)∥∥22 ≤ T4ET + T − T4T (1 + 7ν)C2K2, (109)
where E = (1 + α¯)2(1 + 12C2K2)C2K2 + AD + Bσ¯. Now consider T5 , T4E/νC
2K2. For
T ≥ T5, we then have
1
T
∑
t∈T
E
~ξ1:t
∥∥G¯t −∇L¯ (θ¯t)∥∥22 ≤ (1 + 8ν)C2K2. (110)
Plugging this into equation (104), and using 1/(1− ν) ≤ 1+ 2ν for 0 < ν ≤ 1/2 then yields, for
T ≥ T5,
E
∥∥∇L¯ (θ¯∗)∥∥22 ≤ 4LmaxηT + (1 + ν)(1 + 2ν)(1 + 8ν)C2K2. (111)
Now note that (1+ν)(1+2ν) ≤ 1+4ν for ν ≤ 1/2, which then implies (1+ν)(1+2ν)(1+8ν) ≤
1 + 28ν for ν ≤ 1/2. Now consider T6 , Lmax/(νηC2K2) Then for T ≥ T7 , max {T5, T6}, we
have the guarantee
E
∥∥∇L¯ (θ¯∗)∥∥22 ≤ (1 + 32ν)C2K2 ≤ (1 + 6ν)2C2K2. (112)
Now consider ν = δ/6 (which implies η(δ) , δ/12L), T8 ,
√
D/δ and T = TLearn(δ) ,
max {T7, T8}, we have
E∆2
(
~θ∗
)2
≤ δ2 andE
∥∥∇L¯ (θ¯∗)∥∥22 ≤ (1 + δ)2C2K2, (113)
which corresponds to saying that Learn solves collaborative learning.
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4.4 From collaborative learning to averaging agreement
We now consider the converse reduction: from averaging agreement to collaborative learning.
More precisely, we consider an algorithm that ensures the conditions of Equation (24), and we
prove that we can use this algorithm to guarantee Byzantine-resilient averaging agreement.
Theorem 2. For any δ > 0, Byzantine-resilient (1 + δ)C-averaging agreement can be reduced
to Byzantine-resilient collaborative learning.
Proof. Without loss of generality, assume 0 < δ ≤ 1. Let ~x ∈ Rd·h be a family of vectors. For
any honest node j ∈ [h], consider the losses defined by L(j)(θ) , 12
∥∥θ − x(j)∥∥2
2
. Note that we
thus have ∇L(j) (θ) = θ − x(j).
We can then verify that ∥∥∥∇L(j) (θ)−∇L(j) (θ′)∥∥∥
2
=
∥∥θ − θ′∥∥
2
, (114)
which means that each ∇L(j) (·) is 1-Lipschitz. The local losses thus satisfy Assumption 2 for
L = 1. Moreover, ∥∥∥∇L(j) (θ)−∇L(k) (θ)∥∥∥
2
=
∥∥∥x(j) − x(k)∥∥∥
2
≤ ∆2(~x), (115)
which corresponds to saying that local losses satisfy Equation 25 with K = ∆2(~x). As a
result, the guarantees of Learn apply. In particular, for any t ∈ N, by running Learn for
δ , min
{
1,∆2(~x)/2
t
}
, we have
E
~ξ
∆2(~θt)
2 ≤ ∆2(~x)2/2t. (116)
This guarantees asymptotic agreement.
Next, we notice that
∇L¯ (θ¯t) = 1h ∑
j∈[h]
(θ¯ − x(j)) = θ¯t − x¯. (117)
As a result, the second inequality of Equation (24) guarantees that
E
~ξ
∥∥θ¯t − x¯∥∥22 ≤ (1 + δ)2C2∆2(~x)2. (118)
This shows (1 + δ)C-averaging, and concludes the proof.
5 MDA-based Averaging Agreement
In this section, we present our first solution to the averaging agreement problem based on
Minimum–Diameter Averaging (or in short, MDA). We prove our solution optimal with
respect to the achievable averaging constant. Intuitively, this translates into an optimal form
of learning using the first reduction of the previous section.
5.1 The algorithm
Before presenting our algorithm, a fundamental assumption is in order about the proportion of
Byzantine nodes it tolerates. Essentially, MDA tolerates fewer Byzantine nodes then the solu-
tions we present later, and this is intuitively because MDA is more likely to average Byzantine
inputs that can successfully prevent agreement.
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Assumption 5 (Assumption for analysis of MDA). There is 0 < ε < 1 such that n ≥ 6+2ε1−ε f .
This then allows to set q ≥ 1+ε2 h+ 5+3ε2 f . In this case, we define ε˜ , 2ε1+ε .
Given a family ~z ∈ Rd·q of vectors, MDA first identifies a subfamily SMDA(~z) of q−f vectors
of minimal ℓ2 diameter, i.e.,
SMDA(~z) ∈ argmin
S⊂[q]
|S|=q−f
∆2
(
~z(S)
)
= argmin
S⊂[q]
|S|=q−f
max
j,k∈S
∥∥∥z(j) − z(k)∥∥∥
2
. (119)
We denote ~z(MDA) ∈ Rd·(q−f) the subfamily thereby selected. MDA then outputs the average
of this subfamily, i.e.,
MDA(~z) ,
1
q − f
∑
j∈SMDA(~z)
z(j). (120)
On input t, MDAt iterates MDA NMDA(t) = ⌈t ln 2/ε˜⌉ times. We first note a few important
properties of MDA.
Lemma 11. The ℓ2 diameter of the MDA subfamily is upper-bounded by that of the honest
vectors. In other words, for any Byzantine attack
−−→
Byz, denoting ~z ,
−−→
Byz(~x), we have
∆2
(
~z(MDA)
)
≤ ∆2 (~x) (121)
Proof. Since
−−→
Byz selects q vectors, out of which at most f are Byzantine vectors, we know that
there exists a subset H ⊂ [q] of cardinal q − f that only contains honest vectors. But then, we
have
∆2
(
~z(MDA)
)
= min
S⊂[q]
|S|=q−f
∆2
(
~z(S)
)
≤ ∆2
(
~z(H)
)
≤ ∆2(~x), (122)
which is the lemma.
Lemma 12. Under Assumption 5, MDA guarantees Byzantine-resilient asymptotic agreement.
In other words, for any family ~x ∈ Rd·h, denoting ~xt , MDAt ◦
−−→
Byzt(~x),
∆2(~xt) ≤
∆2(~x)
2t
. (123)
Proof. Denote ~z(1) ,
−−→
Byz
(1)
(~x) and ~z(2) ,
−−→
Byz
(2)
(~x) the results of the two Byzantine attacks,
S1 = SMDA(~z
(1)) and S2 = SMDA(~z
(2)) the subsets selected by MDA in the two cases.
Moreover, we write S1 = H1 ∪F1 and S2 = H2 ∪F2, where H1 and H2 are subsets of honest
vectors within S1 and S2. Without loss of generality, we assume both H1 and H2 to be of
cardinal q − 2f . As a result, we know that there exist injective functions σ1 : H1 → [h] and
σ2 : H2 → [h] such that z(1,j) = x(σ1(j)) and z(2,k) = x(σ2(k)), for all j ∈ H1 and k ∈ H2.
Finally, we denote y(1) , MDA(~z(1)) and y(2) , MDA(~z(2)). We then have
(q − f)
∥∥∥y(1) − y(2)∥∥∥
2
=
∥∥∥∥∥∥
∑
j∈S1
z(1,j) −
∑
k∈S2
z(2,k)
∥∥∥∥∥∥
2
(124)
=
∥∥∥∥∥∥
∑
j∈F1
z(1,j) −
∑
k∈F2
z(2,k) +
∑
j∈σ1(H1)
x(j) −
∑
k∈σ2(H2)
x(k)
∥∥∥∥∥∥
2
(125)
≤
∥∥∥∥∥∥
∑
j∈F1
z(1,j) −
∑
k∈F2
z(2,k)
∥∥∥∥∥∥
2
+
∥∥∥∥∥∥
∑
j∈σ1(H1)−σ2(H2)
x(j) −
∑
k∈σ2(H2)−σ1(H1)
x(k)
∥∥∥∥∥∥
2
. (126)
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Note that |F1| = |S1 −H1| = f = |S2 −H2| = |F2|. Moreover,
|σ1(H1)− σ2(H2)| = |σ1(H1) ∪ σ2(H2)− σ2(H2)| (127)
= |σ1(H1) ∪ σ2(H2)| − |σ2(H2)| ≤ |[h]| − |H2| = 2f + h− q, (128)
and similarly for σ2(H2) − σ1(H1). Now consider any bijections τF : F1 → F2 and τH :
σ1(H1) − σ2(H2) → σ2(H2) − σ1(H1). Note that |σ1(H1)| , |σ2(H2)| ≥ q − 2f . Therefore,
Assumption 5 implies that
|σ1(H1)|+ |σ2(H2)| ≥ 2
(
1 + ε
2
h+
5 + 3ε
2
f − 2f
)
> h, (129)
which yields σ1(H1) ∩ σ2(H2) 6= ∅. Now let γ be an element of the intersection of σ1(H1) and
σ2(H2). Using triangle inequality and Lemma 11, for any j ∈ F1, we then have∥∥∥z(1,j) − z(2,τF (j))∥∥∥
2
≤
∥∥∥z(1,j) − x(γ)∥∥∥
2
+
∥∥∥x(γ) − z(2,τF (j))∥∥∥
2
≤ 2∆2(~x). (130)
Combining it all, yields
(q − f)
∥∥∥y(1) − y(2)∥∥∥
2
≤
∑
j∈F1
∥∥∥z(1,j) − z(2,τF (j))∥∥∥
2
+
∑
j∈σ1(H1)−σ2(H2)
∥∥∥x(j) − x(τH (j))∥∥∥
2
(131)
≤ 2f∆2(~x) + (2f + h− q)∆2(~x), (132)
which implies ∥∥∥y(1) − y(2)∥∥∥
2
≤ 4f + h− q
q − f ∆2(~x). (133)
We then apply Assumption 5, which implies that
4f + h− q
q − f ≤
4f + h− 1+ε2 h− 5+3ε2 f
1+ε
2 h+
5+3ε
2 f − f
=
(1− ε)h+ 3(1− ε)f
(1 + ε)h+ 3(1 + ε)f
(134)
=
1− ε
1 + ε
=
1 + ε− 2ε
1 + ε
= 1− 2ε
1 + ε
= 1− ε˜. (135)
This shows that ∆2(~y) ≤ (1− ε˜)∆2(~x). In other words, one iteration of MDA is guaranteed to
multiply the ℓ2 diameter of honest nodes by at most (1− ε˜). It follows that NMDA(t) = ⌈t ln 2/ε˜⌉
iterations will multiply this diameter by at most (1− ε˜)NMDA(t) ≤ exp
(
− ln(1−ε˜) ln 2ε˜
)t
≤ 2−t.
Lemma 13. MDA returns a vector close to the average of the honest vectors. Denoting ~y ,−−−→
MDA ◦ −−→Byz(~x), we have
‖y¯ − x¯‖2 ≤
(2f + h− q)q + (q − 2f)f
h(q − f) ∆2 (~x) . (136)
In the synchronous case where q = n = f + h, the right-hand side becomes 2fh ∆2 (~x).
Proof. Let us write SMDA(~z) = H∪F , where H are honest vectors and F are Byzantine vectors.
We know that |H| ≥ q − 2f and |H| + |F | = q − f . In fact, without loss of generality, we can
assume |H| = q − 2f (since this is equivalent to labeling honest vectors not in H as Byzantine
vectors).
Let us also denote σ : H → [h] the injective function that maps honest vectors to the index
of their node, and H¯ = [h]− σ(H) the unqueried nodes. We have
‖y − x¯‖2 =
∥∥∥∥∥ |H| z¯
(H) + |F | z¯(F )
|H|+ |F | −
|σ(H)| x¯(σ(H)) + ∣∣H¯∣∣ x¯(H¯)
|σ(H)|+ ∣∣H¯∣∣
∥∥∥∥∥
2
(137)
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=∥∥∥∥∥ |H| z¯
(H) + |F | z¯(F )
|H|+ |F | −
|H| z¯(H) +
∣∣H¯∣∣ x¯(H¯)
|H|+ ∣∣H¯∣∣
∥∥∥∥∥
2
(138)
=
∥∥∥|H| (∣∣H¯∣∣− |F |) z¯(H) + |F | (|H|+ ∣∣H¯∣∣) z¯(F ) − ∣∣H¯∣∣ (|H|+ |F |) x¯(H¯)∥∥∥
2
(|H|+ |F |) (|H|+ ∣∣H¯∣∣) (139)
=
∥∥∥|H| ∣∣H¯∣∣ (z¯(H) − x¯(H¯))+ |F | |H| (z¯(H) − z¯(F ))+ ∣∣H¯∣∣ |F |(z¯(F ) − x¯(H¯))∥∥∥
2
(|H|+ |F |) (|H|+ ∣∣H¯∣∣) (140)
≤
|H|
∣∣H¯∣∣ ∥∥∥z¯(H) − x¯(H¯)∥∥∥
2
+ |F | |H|
∥∥z¯(H) − z¯(F )∥∥
2
+
∣∣H¯∣∣ |F |∥∥∥z¯(F ) − x¯(H¯)∥∥∥
2
(|H|+ |F |) (|H|+ ∣∣H¯∣∣) . (141)
Now note that ∥∥∥z¯(H) − x¯(H¯)∥∥∥
2
=
∥∥∥x¯(σ(H)) − x¯(H¯)∥∥∥
2
(142)
=
1
|σ(H)| ∣∣H¯∣∣
∥∥∥∥∥∥
∣∣H¯∣∣ ∑
j∈σ(H)
x(j) − |H|
∑
k∈H¯
x(k)
∥∥∥∥∥∥
2
(143)
=
1
|σ(H)| ∣∣H¯∣∣
∥∥∥∥∥∥
∑
k∈H¯
∑
j∈σ(H)
x(j) −
∑
j∈σ(H)
∑
k∈H¯
x(k)
∥∥∥∥∥∥
2
(144)
=
1
|σ(H)| ∣∣H¯∣∣
∥∥∥∥∥∥
∑
j∈σ(H)
∑
k∈H¯
(
x(j) − x(k)
)∥∥∥∥∥∥
2
(145)
≤ 1|σ(H)| ∣∣H¯∣∣
∑
j∈σ(H)
∑
k∈H¯
∥∥∥x(j) − x(k)∥∥∥
2
(146)
≤ 1|σ(H)| ∣∣H¯∣∣
∑
j∈σ(H)
∑
k∈H¯
∆2(~x) = ∆2(~x). (147)
Similarly, we show that
∥∥z¯(H) − z¯(F )∥∥
2
≤ ∆2(~z(MDA)) ≤ ∆2(~x). Finally, we use the triangle
inequality to show that∥∥∥z¯(F ) − x¯(H¯)∥∥∥
2
≤
∥∥∥z¯(F ) − z¯(H)∥∥∥
2
+
∥∥∥z¯(H) − x¯(H¯)∥∥∥
2
≤ 2∆2(~x). (148)
Therefore, we now have
‖y − x¯‖2 ≤
|H| ∣∣H¯∣∣+ |F | |H|+ 2 ∣∣H¯∣∣ |F |
(|H|+ |F |) (|H|+ ∣∣H¯∣∣) ∆2(~x) (149)
=
(q − 2f)(2f + h− q) + f(q − 2f) + 2(2f + h− q)f
h(q − f) ∆2(~x) (150)
=
(2f + h− q)q + (q − 2f)f
h(q − f) ∆2(~x), (151)
which is the lemma.
Theorem 3. Under Assumption 5, MDA achieves Byzantine-resilient (2f+h−q)q+(q−2f)fh(q−f)ε˜ -averaging
agreement.
Proof. Lemma 12 already proved asymptotic agreement. Moreover, using Lemma 13, and de-
noting α , (2f+h−q)q+(q−2f)fh(q−f) and ~xs the vector family obtained after s iterations of MDA, we
also know that ∥∥x¯s+1 − x¯s∥∥2 ≤ α∆2(~xt) ≤ α(1− ε˜)s∆2(~x0). (152)
22
Using triangle inequality then yields, for any number N of iterations of MDA,
‖x¯N − x¯0‖2 ≤
N−1∑
s=0
∥∥x¯s+1 − x¯s∥∥2 ≤ N−1∑
s=0
α(1 − ε˜)s∆2(~x0) (153)
≤ α∆2(~x0)
∞∑
s=0
(1− ε˜)s = α∆2(~x0)
ε˜
, (154)
which is the guarantee of the theorem.
Corollary 1. In the regime f ≪ h and f ≪ q, MDA achieves asymptotically the best-possible
averaging constant.
Proof. From Assumption 5, we can set
ε =
n− 6f
n+ 2f
=
h− 5f
h+ 3f
= 1− 8f
h+ 3f
, (155)
which then implies
ε˜ =
2ε
1 + ε
=
2− 16fh+3f
2− 8fh+3f
=
2h+ 6f − 16f
2h+ 6f − 8f
=
h− 5f
h− f = 1−
4f
h
1
1− fh
= 1 +O(f/h).
Now notice that
(2f + h− q)q + (q − 2f)f
h(q − f)ε˜ =
2f + h− q
h(1− fq )ε˜
+
f
h
1− 2fq
(1− fq )ε˜
(156)
=
2f + h− q
h
(
1 +O
(
f
h
+
f
q
))
+O
(
f
h
)
, (157)
which concludes the proof.
5.2 Lower bound on the averaging constant
We prove here a lower bound on the averaging constant that any algorithm can achieve.
Theorem 4. No asynchronous algorithm can achieve better than Byzantine-resilient h+2f−qh -
averaging agreement. In the synchronous case, no algorithm achieves better than fh -averaging
agreement.
Definition 5 (⋆ notation). We note x ⋆ h ,
(
x, . . . , x︸ ︷︷ ︸
h times
)
the repetition of a value x h times.
Proof. Consider the vector family defined by
~x , (0 ⋆ (q − 2f), 1 ⋆ (h+ 2f − q)) . (158)
For any algorithm Avg used by honest nodes, Byzantine nodes can slow down all messages
from nodes in [q − f + 1, h] to nodes in [q − f ]. Thus, the first q − f honest nodes would be
making decisions without receiving any input from nodes in [q− f +1, h]. Assume now that the
Byzantine nodes all act exactly like the first q− 2f nodes. Then, all first q− f nodes would see
q− f nodes acting like honest nodes with initial vector 0, and f nodes acting like honest nodes
with initial vector 1.
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But as a result, the first q− 2f nodes cannot exclude the possibility that the f nodes acting
like honest nodes with initial vector 1 are Byzantine nodes. And thus, they cannot exclude the
possibility that all honest nodes all started with initial vector 0.
Using the same argument as in Lemma 16, this implies that, for any t ∈ N all first q − 2f
nodes must output 0. But by asymptotic agreement, this implies that any other honest node
must output a vector at distance at most ∆2(~x)/2
t = 1/2t of 0. As a result, as t→∞ , denoting
~xt the output of Avg for input t, we must have x¯t → 0.
Since ∆2(~x) = 1 and x¯ = (h+ 2f − q)/h, we then have
lim
t→0
|x¯t − x¯| = |0− x¯| = h+ 2f − q
h
≥ h+ 2f − q
h
∆2(~x). (159)
This shows that Avg cannot achieve better than h+2f−qh -averaging agreement.
The synchronous case is dealt with by considering ~x , (0 ⋆ (n − 2f), 1 ⋆ f), and by having
Byzantine nodes acting like honest nodes with inputs 0. Again, all nodes must agree on 0, which
is at distance at f/h = f∆2(~x)/h of the actual average of honest nodes.
5.3 Note on Byzantine tolerance
Our MDA algorithm tolerates a small fraction of Byzantine nodes, namely n > 6f . It is easy
to see that MDA cannot tolerate more Byzantine nodes.
Theorem 5. If n ≤ 6f − 1, then MDA can fail to achieve asymptotic agreement.
Proof. Let δ , 1/f . Consider
~x , (−1 ⋆ 2f, 0 ⋆ (f − 1), 1 ⋆ 2f). (160)
For the first 2f nodes, Byzantine nodes can block f of the messages of the last 2f nodes, and
adds f values equal to −2 + δ. The first 2f honest nodes then observe
~z1 , ((−2 + δ) ⋆ f,−1 ⋆ 2f, 0 ⋆ (f − 1), 1 ⋆ f). (161)
MDA would then remove the largest f inputs, as it then achieves a diameter equal to 2 − δ.
The first 2f nodes would then output (assuming that δ = 1/f)
(−2 + δ)f − 2f
4f − 1 = −
4f − δf
4f − 1 = −1. (162)
For the middle f − 1 nodes, Byzantine nodes can simply allow perfect communication and not
intervene. By symmetry, the middle f − 1 nodes would output 1 (note that to be rigorous, we
could define MDA as taking the average of the outputs over all subsets of inputs of minimal
diameter).
For the last 2f nodes, Byzantine nodes can block f messages of the first 2f nodes, and add
f values equal to 2− δ. The situation is then symmetric to the case for the first 2f nodes, and
make the last 2f nodes output 1.
As a result, the output of MDA is equal to its input. Thus, there has been no contraction.
This shows that no asymptotic agreement can be achieved, despite iterations of MDA.
5.4 Note on computational complexity
Although the time complexity of MDA algorithm is linear in d, which is critical in modern
machine learning applications, where d might be in the order of hundreds of millions, MDA
requires finding the subset with minimum diameter by brute-force searching among all
( q
q−f
)
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possibilities, which are exponential in number in terms of f . Therefore, we introduce another
distance-based algorithm which is still asymptotically optimal, but its complexity is linear in
both d and n.
In Closest–Vectors Averaging (or in short CVA) algorithm, each node selects q − f
vectors that are in minimum ℓ2 distance from its local vector, i.e., assuming node (i) with local
vector x(i) is running CVA,
S
(i)
CVA
(~z) ∈ argmin
S⊂[q]
|S|=q−f
max
j∈S
∥∥∥z(j) − x(i)∥∥∥
2
. (163)
CVA then computes the average of this subset, i.e.,
CVA
(i)(~z) ,
1
q − f
∑
j∈S(i)
CVA
(~z)
z(j). (164)
The asymptotic optimality of CVA can be proved by using the same sketch of the proof asMDA
and setting n ≥ 7+3ε1−ε f , and q ≥ 1+ε2 h+ (3 + 2ε)f in Assumption 5. However, the disadvantage
of CVA compared to MDA is that it requires n ≥ 7f+1, which is more restrictive. As a result,
there is a trade-off between better computational complexity of CVA and better Byzantine
resilience of MDA.
The question of how to reduce the proportion of Byzantine failures that can be tolerated
by an algorithm that achieves optimal averaging constant is open. We will come back to this
question at the end of the paper.
6 Broadcast-based Averaging Agreement
In this section, we give an algorithm that solves the averaging agreement problem requiring only
n ≥ 3f + 1, achieving the optimal resilience with respect to the number of Byzantine nodes.
6.1 The algorithm
We essentially adapt the idea from [1] to show that averaging agreement can be achieved for
n ≥ 3f +1, and q = n− f . To do so, we recall that, using reliable broadcast, we can force each
Byzantine node k ∈ [h + 1, n] to broadcast only a single vector x(k). Moreover, [1] showed the
existence of a multi-round algorithm that guarantees that any two honest nodes j1 and j2 will
collect at least q similar inputs. Formally, denoting Q(j) ⊆ [n] the set of nodes whose messages
were successfully delivered to node j (including through relays), the algorithm by [1] guarantees
that
∣∣Q(j1) ∩Q(j2)∣∣ ≥ q.
Now, given its set Q(j) of collected messages, each node j will perform a coordinate-wise
trimmed middle as follows. For each coordinate i, it will discard the f smallest i-th coordinates
it collected, as well as the f largest. Node j will then take minimum and the maximum i-th
coordinate left, and compute the average between this minimum and maximum.
Theorem 6. For n ≥ 3f+1 and q = n−f , iterating this algorithm t+⌈log2 h⌉ times guarantees
2
√
h-averaging agreement.
Proof. Note that we essentially described a coordinate-wise version of the algorithm by [1].
In dimension 1, this algorithm was already shown to divide by two the diameter of honest
nodes. As an immediate corollary, each coordinate-wise diameter is divided by 2. Iterating this
operation N = t+ ⌈log2 h⌉ times guarantees that the output ~y, given starting vector family ~x,
satisfies
∆2(~y) ≤ ∆cw2 (~y) ≤
1
2N
∆cw2 (~x) ≤
h
2t+log2 h
∆2(~x) ≤ 1
2t
∆2(~x), (165)
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which proves agreement.
Now [1] also proved that, in dimension 1, the outputs of the algorithm are guaranteed to lie
between the extreme values of honest nodes. As a result, so does the average of the outputs.
In our case, this implies that, no matter how many times t the algorithm is iterated,
|y¯[i]− x¯[i]| ≤ ∆cw(~x)[i], (166)
which then implies that
‖y¯ − x¯‖2 ≤ ∆cw2 (~x) ≤ 2
√
h∆2(~x), (167)
using Lemma 2. This concludes the proof.
6.2 Lower bound on Byzantine tolerance
We prove that any asynchronous Byzantine-resilient averaging agreement requires at least n ≥
3f + 1.
Lemma 14 (Quasi-unanimity). If a node j only hears from q nodes, and if q−f of these nodes
act like honest nodes with the same initial value, then node j must output this initial value.
Proof. For any agreeing initial family ~x = x⋆h, we have ∆2(~x) = 0 and x¯ = x. Then averaging
agreement implies that, for any t ∈ N, we output ~xt such that
∆2(~xt) ≤
∆2(~x)
2t
= 0 and ‖x¯t − x‖2 ≤ C∆2(~x) = 0. (168)
In other words, we must have ~xt = ~x.
But then, if node j only hears from q nodes, and if it receives q−f nodes agreeing on a value
x, then it cannot exclude the possibility that the remaining f nodes come from Byzantine nodes.
As a result, it cannot exclude that the initial family was ~x. To satisfy averaging agreement,
node j must then output x.
Theorem 7. For n ≤ 3f , no algorithm can achieve Byzantine-resilient averaging agreement.
Proof. If n ≤ 3f , then h = n− f ≤ 2f . Thus honest nodes can be partitioned into two subsets
of cardinals at most f . In particular, for any subset, Byzantine nodes can block all messages
coming from the other subset. Any subset would thus only hear from nodes of the subset and
from the Byzantine nodes.
Assume now by contradiction that Avg achieves Byzantine-resilience averaging agreement
for n ≤ 3f . Note that we then have q ≤ 2f . As a result q − f ≤ f . Thus the previous lemma
applies to Avg for f agreeing nodes. Byzantine nodes can act like these f agreeing nodes. By
sending ~z = z ⋆f , they can thus guarantee that any attacked node running a Byzantine-resilient
averaging agreement must output z, for any value z chosen by the Byzantine nodes. Clearly,
this prevents averaging. Thus Avg fails to achieve averaging agreement.
7 ICwTM-based Solution to Averaging Agreement
In this section, we present a solution to the averaging agreement problem based on Iterated
Coordinate–wise Trimmed Mean (or in short, ICwTM). The interest of this solution is
that, unlike the previous one, it does not rely on signatures.
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7.1 The algorithm
Assumption 6. There is 0 ≤ ε < 1 such that n ≥ 4(1−2ε)1−4ε f + 1. This enables to set q ≥
1+4ε
2 h+ 2f +
1
2 . We then define ε˜ ,
⌈2εh+1/2⌉
2(q−2f) .
For instance, for ε = 1/12, the above condition implies n ≥ 5f + 1. Moreover, for ε = 0,
evidently, we obtain the condition n ≥ 4f + 1. In synchronous settings, this can be reduced to
n ≥ 3f + 1, which is the same lower bound of the approximate agreement problem [12]. Note
that our guarantees still hold in this case, though they are expressed in terms of ε˜. Crucially,
we have ε˜ ≥ 12(q−2f) > 0, which suffices for our results.
In this section, we show that averaging agreement can be guaranteed for q ≥ 3f + 1. More
precisely, we prove that iterated coordinate-wise trimmed mean, denoted ICwTM, achieves
averaging agreement guarantees under Assumption 6.
First, let us define coordinate-wise trimmed mean, denoted CwTM. It takes as input a
family ~z =
(
z(1), . . . , ~z(q)
)
of vectors z(j) ∈ Rd. Then, for each coordinate i ∈ [d], CwTM
excludes the f smallest values and the f largest values z(j)[i], for j ∈ [q]. CwTM then averages
out the remaining q − 2f values. This will be the i-th coordinate of CwTM (~z).
We apply CwTM to perform Byzantine-resilient averaging agreement of honest nodes. To
do so, nodes exchange their local vectors ~x. Byzantine nodes get to transform them, yielding
Byz
(j) (~x) to be observed by node j. Note that the Byzantine nodes cannot alter more than f
values in this family. Node j then applies CwTM to this input, to obtain CwTM ◦Byz(j) (~x).
We denote
−−−−−→
CwTM ◦ −−→Byz (~x) the resulting family of vectors.
Iterated coordinated-wise trimmed mean ICwTM consists of applying repeatedly CwTM.
More precisely, given input t, ICwTM iterates CwTM NICwTM(t) times, where
NICwTM(t) ,
⌈
2(t+ 1) ln 2 + lnh
2ε˜
⌉
. (169)
In the sequel, we show that ICwTM achieves Byzantine-resilient averaging agreement. To
do so, we first derive properties of CwTM.
Lemma 15 (Contraction by CwTM). Under Assumption 6, CwTM guarantees the contraction
of the coordinate-wise diameters, that is,
∀~x, ∀−−→Byz,∆cw
(−−−−−→
CwTM ◦ −−→Byz (~x)
)
≤ (1− ε˜)∆cw (~x) . (170)
As an immediate corollary, this inequality holds by taking the ℓr-norm on both sides, which
means that the coordinate-wise ℓr-diameter is also contracted by the same factor.
Proof. Consider any coordinate i ∈ [d]. We denote x(min)[i] = min
j∈[h]
x(j)[i] and x(max)[i] =
max
j∈[h]
x(j)[i] the minimal and maximal i-th coordinate among the parameters. Moreover, we
denote
x(mid)[i] =
x(min)[i] + x(max)[i]
2
, (171)
the middle point of the interval
[
x(min)[i], x(max)[i]
]
. We now separate the honest nodes into
two subsets left[i] and right[i], depending on whether the i-th coordinate of the node is on the
left or on the right of the middle point x(mid)[i], i.e.
left[i] =
{
j ∈ [h]
∣∣∣ x(j)[i] ≤ x(mid)[i]} and right[i] = [h]− left[i]. (172)
Since the two subsets partition [h], one of them must contain at most ⌊h/2⌋ nodes. Assume
without loss of generality that it is left[i]. Thus |left[i]| ≤ ⌊h/2⌋. Now, given that Q(j)t ⊆ [n],
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since there are at most f Byzantine nodes, and since node j queries q inputs, we know that∣∣∣Q(j)t ∩ [h]∣∣∣ = ∣∣∣Q(j)t − [h+ 1, n]∣∣∣ ≥ ∣∣∣Q(j)t ∣∣∣ − |[h+ 1, h+ f ]| = q − f . But given Assumption 6,
this implies that ∣∣∣Q(j)t ∩ [h]∣∣∣ ≥ 1 + 4ε2 h+ f + 12 . (173)
But we also know that Q
(j)
t ∩ [h] ⊆ [h], which implies∣∣∣Q(j)t ∩ [h]∣∣∣ = ∣∣∣Q(j)t ∩ left[i]∣∣∣+ ∣∣∣Q(j)t ∩ right[i]∣∣∣ ≤ |left[i]|+ ∣∣∣Q(j)t ∩ right[i]∣∣∣ . (174)
Combining the above inequalities imply∣∣∣Q(j)t ∩ right[i]∣∣∣ ≥ 1 + 4ε2 h+ f + 1−
⌊
h
2
⌋
= 2εh + f +
1
2
. (175)
But since the cardinal of the set Q
(j)
t ∩ right[i] must be an integer, this then implies that the
(⌈2εh+1/2⌉+f)-th largest i-th coordinate among the q inputs collected by any node to compute
CwTM is at least x(mid). Moreover, apart from the f Byzantine, we know that all inputs have
an i-th coordinate at least x(min)[i]. This implies that CwTM applied to coordinate i averages
q − 2f values, among which q − 2f − ⌈2εh + 1/2⌉ are at least x(min)[i], and the remaining
⌈2εh + 1/2⌉ ones are at least x(mid)[i]. Therefore, for any node j computing CwTM, despite
Byzantine attacks, denoting ~y = CwTM ◦ −−→Byz (~x), we have
y(j)[i] ≥ (q − 2f − ⌈2εh+ 1/2⌉)x
(min)[i] + ⌈2εh+ 1/2⌉ x(mid)[i]
q − 2f (176)
= x(min)[i] +
⌈2εh+ 1/2⌉
q − 2f
(
x(mid)[i]− x(min)[i]
)
(177)
≥ x(min)[i] + ⌈2εh+ 1/2⌉
2(q − 2f) ∆
cw (~x) [i] (178)
= x(min)[i] + ε˜∆cw (~x) [i], (179)
where, in the third line, we used both q−2f ≤ n−f = h and x(mid)[i]−x(min)[i] = ∆cw (~x) [i]/2.
By also noting that, apart from the f Byzantine nodes, all inputs must have an i-th coordinate
at least x(max)[i], we can also conclude that y(j)[i] ≤ x(max)[i]. Thus, all coordinates i of ~y
must belong to the interval
[
x(min)[i] + ε∆cw (x) [i], x(max)[i]
]
. Therefore the diameter along
coordinate i of ~y is upper-bounded by the size of the interval, i.e.
∆cw (~y) [i] ≤ (1− ε˜)∆cw (x) [i]. (180)
This is what we wanted.
We have the following corollary regarding ICwTM.
Corollary 2. Under Assumption 6, for any input t ∈ N, the algorithm ICwTM guarantees
Byzantine-resilient asymptotic agreement, i.e.,
∆2
(−−−−−−→
ICwTMt ◦ −−→Byzt(~x)
)
≤ ∆2 (~x)
2t
. (181)
Proof. First note that since ICwTM iterates CwTM, there is actually a sequence of attacks−−→
Byzτ at each iteration τ ∈ [NICwTM]. In fact, we have a sequence of families ~yτ defined by ~y0 , ~x
and ~yτ+1 ,
−−−−−→
CwTM ◦−−→Byzτ (~yτ ) for τ ∈ [NICwTM − 1]. We eventually have
−−−−−−→
ICwTM ◦−−→Byz(~x) =
~yNICwTM .
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Note that the previous lemma implies that
∆cw
(
~yτ+1
) ≤ (1− ε˜)∆cw (~yτ ) . (182)
Taking the ℓ2 norm on both sides then implies that
∆cw2
(
~yτ+1
)
=
∥∥∆cw (~yτ+1)∥∥2 ≤ (1− ε˜) ‖∆cw (~yτ )‖2 = (1− ε˜)∆cw2 (~yτ ) . (183)
It follows straightforwardly that
∆cw2 (~x) ≤ (1− ε˜)NICwTM(t)∆cw2
(
~yNICwTM
)
(184)
≤ (1− ε˜) 2(t+1) ln 2+lnh2ε˜ ∆cw2
(
~yNICwTM
)
(185)
= exp
(
ln(1− ε˜)
2ε˜
(2(t+ 1) ln 2 + lnh)
)
∆cw2
(
~yNICwTM
)
(186)
≤ exp
(
− ε˜
2ε˜
(2(t+ 1) ln 2 + lnh)
)
∆cw2
(
~yNICwTM
)
(187)
≤ exp (−(t+ 1) ln 2) exp
(
− lnh
2
)
∆cw2
(
~yNICwTM
)
(188)
=
1
21+t
√
h
∆cw2
(
~yNICwTM
)
, (189)
where we used the inequality ln(1 + u) ≤ u for u ∈ (−1, 0]. We now conclude by invoking
Lemma 1, which implies
∆2(~x) ≤ ∆cw2 (~x) ≤ 2−t
∆cw2 (~yNICwTM)
2
√
h
≤ 2−t∆2
(
~yNICwTM
)
, (190)
which proves that ICwTM achieves asymptotic agreement.
Theorem 8. Under Assumption 6, ICwTM guarantees Byzantine-resilient 2(2f+h−q)
√
h
h -averaging
agreement.
Proof. Consider a family ~x0 ∈ Rd·h. We first focus on coordinate i ∈ [d] only. We sort the
family using a permutation σ of [h], so that
x
(σ(1))
0 ≤ x(σ(2))0 ≤ . . . ≤ x(σ(h−1))0 ≤ x(σ(h))0 . (191)
Now denote ~z =
−−→
Byz
(j)
0 (~x0) ∈ Rd·q the result of a Byzantine attack. Again, we sort the vectors
of this family, using a permutation τ of [q], so that
z(τ(1))[i] ≤ z(τ(2))[i] ≤ . . . ≤ z(τ(q−1))[i] ≤ z(τ(q))[i]. (192)
Now, denoting y , CwTM(~z), we note that
y[i] =
1
q − 2f
q−2f∑
j=1
z(τ(f+j))[i]. (193)
Moreover, note that there are f + j − 1 values of ~z that are smaller than z(τ(f+j))[i]. These can
include f Byzantine vectors. But the remaining j− 1 values must then come from the family of
honest vectors. Yet the j − 1 smallest vectors of this family are x(σ(1))0 [i], . . . , x(σ(j−1))0 [i]. But
then, z(τ(f+j))[i] will have to take a value on the right of x
(σ(j−1))
0 [i] in the list of honest vectors,
which corresponds to saying that
∀j ∈ [q − f ], z(τ(f+j))[i] ≥ x(σ(j))0 [i]. (194)
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But then, we know that
y[i] ≥ 1
q − 2f
q−2f∑
j=1
x
(σ(j))
0 . (195)
As an immediate corollary, we see that y[i] ≥ x(σ(1))0 [i], which also implies that
x
(σ(j))
0 [i] ≤ x(σ(1))0 [i] + max
k∈[h]
(
x
(σ(k))
0 [i]− x(σ(1))0 [i]
)
≤ y[i] + ∆cw(~x0)[i]. (196)
But now notice that
x¯[i] =
1
h
h∑
j=1
x
(σ(j))
0 =
1
h
q−2f∑
j=1
x
(σ(j))
0 +
1
h
h∑
j=q−2f
x
(σ(j))
0 (197)
≤ 1
h
((q − 2f)y[i]) + 1
h
h∑
j=q−2f
(y[i] + ∆cw(~x0)[i]) (198)
= y[i] +
h− q + 2f
h
∆cw(~x0)[i]. (199)
Similarly, we can also prove that x¯[i] ≥ y[i]− h−q+2fh ∆cw(~x0)[i], which implies that
|y[i]− x¯[i]| ≤ h− q + 2f
h
∆cw(~x0)[i], (200)
and thus that ‖y − x¯‖2 ≤ h−q+2fh ‖∆cw(~x0)‖2 = h−q+2fh ∆cw2 (~x0). In fact, more generally, we
showed that, for any Byzantine attack
−−→
Byz
(j)
0 , we have
CwTM ◦ −−→Byz(j)0 (~x0) ∈ Y0 = x¯+
(2f + h− q)
h
∏
i∈[d]
[−∆cw(~x0)[i],+∆cw(~x0)[i]] . (201)
Yet the proof of the previous theorem showed that any such parallelepiped was stable under
application of coordinate-wise trimmed mean despite Byzantine attacks. Thus, for any time
t ≥ 1, we still have x(j)t ∈ Y0, which then guarantees that
‖x¯t − x¯0‖2 =
∥∥∥∥∥∥1h
∑
j∈[h]
(
x
(j)
t − x¯0
)∥∥∥∥∥∥
2
(202)
≤ 1
h
∑
j∈[h]
∥∥∥(x(j)t − x¯0)∥∥∥
2
(203)
≤ 1
h
∑
j∈[h]
(2f + h− q)
h
‖∆cw(~x0)‖2 =
(2f + h− q)
h
∆cw2 (~x0). (204)
Lemma 1 then guarantees ∆cw2 (~x0) ≤ 2
√
h∆2(~x0). We conclude by noting that ICwTM corre-
sponds to iterating CwTM.
Remark 3. It follows from Lemma 1 that the averaging constant of ICwTM is actually
2f+h−q
h min
{
2
√
h,
√
d
}
. But in many machine learning applications, we typically expect d≫ h,
in which case min
{
2
√
h,
√
d
}
= 2
√
h.
30
7.2 Lower bound on Byzantine tolerance
We show here that our ICwTM algorithm is also, in a precise sense, optimal. ICwTM is
optimal within protocols that do not use signatures and follow the standard form [9].
Definition 6. An algorithm Avg is of a standard form if, at each round, each honest node
has a vector, sends only this vector, and updates its vector based on its previous value and the
vectors it received from other nodes.
We prove below that no algorithm Avg in the standard form [9] solves averaging agreement
problem with q ≤ 3f .
Notice first that that we already know that any Byzantine-resilient averaging agreement
algorithm requires q ≥ 2f + 1. Evidently, this inequality holds for algorithms int the standard
form. But we can say more.
Lemma 16 (Quasi-unanimity). Given any Byzantine-resilient averaging agreement algorithm
Avg in the standard form, whenever at least q − 2f honest nodes initially agree on the same
vector x, then Byzantine nodes can guarantee that these honest nodes will output x.
Proof. Let J ⊂ [h] such that |J | ≥ q − 2f and x(j) = x for all j ∈ J . In other words, all nodes
in J have the same initial vector x. Byzantine nodes can then make sure that all nodes in J
receive q − 2f messages from J , and f Byzantine inputs equal to x, as well as f inputs from
other honest nodes. Call K the set of these other honest nodes.
If Avg is in the standard form, there would be no way for nodes in K to prove that they are
not Byzantine nodes or that Byzantine nodes are Byzantine (in particular, they cannot prove
that the Byzantine nodes may be sending different messages to other nodes). As a result, each
node in J cannot exclude the possibility that the first q − 2f messages and the messages from
the Byzantine nodes are all honest messages. In particular, each node in J cannot exclude the
possibility that all honest nodes started with the same vector x, i.e., that the vector family of
honest nodes is ~x = x ⋆ h.
But if this is the case, then ∆2(~x) = 0. Asymptotic agreement implies that, applying Avg,
all honest nodes must output the same vector, while C-averaging implies that their average
output must be at distance at most C∆2(~x) = 0 from the true average x¯ = x. Thus, if Avg
guarantees averaging agreement, it must guarantee that all nodes in J output x.
Theorem 9. For q ≤ 3f , no standard–form algorithm can achieve Byzantine-resilient averaging
agreement.
Proof. Note that if h ≤ 2f , then 2(h − f) ≤ h + h − 2f ≤ h. Thus q − 2f ≤ h + f − 2f =
h − f ≤ h/2. By taking the floor on both sides, we even see that q − 2f = ⌊q − 2f⌋ ≤ ⌊h/2⌋.
Note that, conversely, if h ≥ 2f , then q − 2f ≤ 3f − 2f = f ≤ ⌊h/2⌋. Thus, in any case, we
have q − 2f ≤ ⌊h/2⌋.
Now consider the vector family
~x , (x1 ⋆ ⌊h/2⌋, x2 ⋆ ⌈h/2⌉). (205)
Nodes of the family can be divided into two subsets [⌊h/2⌋] and [⌊h/2⌋+ 1, h], each of which is
of cardinal at least q − 2f . Thus, given any Byzantine-resilient averaging agreement algorithm
Avg in the standard form, Byzantine nodes can make sure that the first ⌊h/2⌋ honest nodes
output x1, while the last ⌈h/2⌉ honest nodes output x2. Assuming x1 6= x2, this shows that no
contraction is achieved. Thus Avg fails to achieve asymptotic agreement.
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8 Concluding Remarks
Summary
This paper poses and addresses for the first time the problem of collaborative learning in a
Byzantine environment: a set of n nodes try to collectively learn from data. The problem is
general in the sense that none of these nodes is trusted: f < n can behave arbitrarily. It is also
general in the sense that we consider a heterogeneous setting: data distributions may vary from
one node to another
We show that the collaborative learning problem can be reduced to a new abstract form
of agreement, which we call the averaging agreement problem, and for which we propose three
solutions, each optimal according to some dimension and thus, we believe, interesting in its
own right. The first of our solutions is asymptotically optimal in terms of the “quality” of
the agreement, which induces an optimal solution in terms of the “quality” of the learning.
The algorithm requires however n ≥ 6f + 1. Our second algorithm achieves optimal Byzantine
resilience, i.e., n ≥ 3f+1, but requires signatures and a large number of communication rounds.
Our third algorithm is faster and achieves optimal Byzantine resilience, i.e., n ≥ 4f +1, within
standard form algorithms that do not use signatures.
All our solutions are asynchronous: we do not assume any bounds on communication delays
or node relative speeds. Assuming a synchronous context, we could devise algorithms that
would only require respectively 5f + 1, 2f + 1 and 3f + 1, respectively.
Future work
We argue that our work opens the door to multiple interesting future research questions. In
particular, the study of the averaging agreement problem, combined with additional desirable
computational properties, seems worth investigating.
First, while all of our algorithms have a computational complexity that is quasi-linear in
dimension d, which is what is most critical in practical applications where d can be in the
order of millions or billions, the computational complexity with respect to other inputs, like the
number of nodes n, may be improved upon. In particular, the search for a Byzantine-resilient
averaging agreement algorithm, whose complexity is quasi-linear in both d and n, and that
achieves an (asymptotically) optimal averaging constant, is open.
In the same vein, we leave open the problem of designing sublinear-time Byzantine-resilient
averaging agreement algorithms. This question is also closely related to optimizing the commu-
nication complexity of our averaging agreement algorithms, especially in terms of bandwidth.
The study of the interplay between computational complexity, communication complexity and
the averaging constant is left for future work.
Also, we leave open the exact trade-off between the averaging constant that can be achieved
and the number of Byzantine nodes that can be tolerated. It is also important to explore
different techniques to preserve privacy in such collaborative environments. In particular, a
relevant question here is whether we can design (efficient) privacy-preserving Byzantine-resilient
averaging agreement algorithms.
Other interesting questions include whether we can design Byzantine-resilient averaging
agreement algorithms for different communication network typologies or for permissionless sys-
tems (where the set of involved nodes are not known in advance).
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